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Abstract
This Comment examines how a mediator’s nationality can influence the mediating parties’
and communities’ perceptions of his neutrality and how cultural differences play a role in the ethical expectations of a cross-cultural mediator. Part I discusses the role of neutrality in cross-cultural
mediation and how neutrality is required and interpreted by codified ethical standards for mediators in the United States and in several international organizations. Part II discusses the role of
culture in mediation, how culture influences ethical expectations, and the case studies of George
Mitchell, a mediator in Ireland and Israel-Palestine, and Lakhdar Brahimi, a mediator in Syria.
Mitchell and Brahimi are examples of mediators who worked with cultures that had different ethical expectations of the mediator’s role than they were accustomed to in their respective cultures.
They both resigned in frustration and experienced great difficulty and public ridicule during their
terms. Part III analyzes Mitchell and Brahimi’s trials and failures in their mediations, and provides
suggestions for mediators involved in cross-cultural mediations. Through this analysis this Comment clarifies the role of neutrality in mediation and how a mediator’s nationality influences how
mediating parties and their communities perceive his neutrality.
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INTRODUCTION
To date, over 200,000 people have died in the Syrian conflict,
with about half of the population displaced in the largest forced
population migration since World War II.1 Although such
circumstances deserve immediate resolution, Special Envoy Lakhdar
Brahimi, with the participation of the United States and Russia, could
not manage to facilitate a resolution to this conflict between the
Syrian government and opposition, and resigned in frustration in

1. The Syrian Humanitarian Crisis: Four Years Later and No End in Sight: Testimony
Before the H. Foreign Affairs Subcomm. on the Middle East and North Africa and the
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and Int'l Orgs, 114th Cong.
(2015) (statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Kelly T. Clements), http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/FA/FA13/20150212/102953/HHRG-114-FA13-Wstate-ClementsK-20150212.pdf
(“Not since World War II raged across three continents has violence and persecution driven so
many people from their homes. . . . So far, the conflict has claimed the lives of over 200,000
Syrians. . . . The Syrian crisis has set unenviable records, producing almost four million
refugees, more than any other modern conflict, and forcibly displacing more than seven
million internally, the vast majority as a result of the Assad regime’s campaign of
destruction.”); Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
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2014.2 This failure to reach a resolution in Syria may have been due
to misunderstandings, including differing cultural perspectives and
the preferences of the mediating parties and their mediator, Brahimi.3
A mediator’s nationality and cultural background can influence
how he conducts mediations and how the parties of the mediation
perceive him and his methods.4 In the mediation process a mediator’s
role is to assist the disputants in communicating with each other,
identify and clarify issues, and consider available options in order to
reach a consensual agreement that is fair and equitable to the parties.5
To achieve these objectives, it is recommended by most codes of
conduct for mediators that a mediator remain neutral and impartial.6 It
is also crucial that the parties involved in the mediation believe that
the mediator is trustworthy and neutral with respect to the issues
involved in the conflict because this will allow the parties to be
comfortable with his guidance and, as a result, come to an uncoerced
agreement.7
The cultural perspectives of the participants influence the
character and circumstances of a mediation.8 Differing cultural
2. Infra notes 270-83 (explaining Brahimi’s mediation between the Syrian opposition
and government).
3. Infra notes 319-28 (discussing how cultural differences and expectations stymied
progress in Brahimi’s mediation in Syria).
4. See Walter A. Wright, Cultural Issues in Mediation: Individualist and Collectivist
Paradigms, MEDIATE.COM (Jan. 2000), http://www.mediate.com/pfriendly.cfm?id=57
(discussing how individualist and collectivist cultural values influence mediation methods);
see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Harold I. Abramson, Mediating Multiculturally: Culture
and the Ethical Mediator, in MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES & COMMENTARIES 305-38, (Ellen
Waldman ed., 2011); Cheryl Rivers, Lying Cheating Foreigners! Negotiation Ethics across
Cultures, 12 INT’L NEGOTIATION 1 (2007).
5. Hin Hung, Neutrality and Impartiality in Mediation, 5 ADR BULLETIN 3 (2002), art. 7
at 1; Joseph B. Stulberg, Must a Mediator Be Neutral?, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV 831 (2012)
(viewing “mediation as an efficient tool for facilitating agreement and gaining compliance
among disputing persons about future-looking plans”).
6. Hung, supra note 5, at 1; Rachael Field, Neutrality and Power: Myths and Reality, 3
ADR BULLETIN 1, 16 (2000) (“Neutrality is a key concept in the process of mediation, with
‘definitions of mediation frequently assert[ing] that the mediator is a neutral intervener in the
parties’ dispute. For example, one of the most commonly accepted and often cited definitions
provided by Folberg and Taylor refers to mediation as a process involving ‘the assistance of a
neutral person or persons.’”); see also infra notes 52-116.
7. Hung, supra note 5, at 1; Field, supra note 6, at 16 (“This firm connection between
neutrality and fundamental definitional aspects of mediation theory is also related to
neutrality's ‘important legitimising function for mediation.’ People are drawn to the mediation
process on the basis of the perceived promise that neutrality holds.”).
8. Wright, supra note 4, at 1; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307
(“Cultural lenses tint virtually every scene we encounter. . . . Experts in intercultural
negotiation have identified a series of cultural features that influence disputing style.”).

698

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:695

ideologies have the potential to cause an impasse in the mediation if
the participants’ views diverge on fundamental issues such as
individual autonomy and group interdependence.9 Cultural
experiences also influence the participants’ expectations of the
mediator’s role.10 Consequently, complications may arise if the
mediator—due to his nationality or background—identifies with one
party’s culture more than another’s.11
This Comment examines how a mediator’s nationality can
influence the mediating parties’ and communities’ perceptions of his
neutrality and how cultural differences play a role in the ethical
expectations of a cross-cultural mediator. Part I discusses the role of
neutrality in cross-cultural mediation and how neutrality is required
and interpreted by codified ethical standards for mediators in the
United States and in several international organizations. Part II
discusses the role of culture in mediation, how culture influences
ethical expectations, and the case studies of George Mitchell, a
mediator in Ireland and Israel-Palestine, and Lakhdar Brahimi, a
mediator in Syria.12 Mitchell and Brahimi are examples of mediators
who worked with cultures that had different ethical expectations of
the mediator’s role than they were accustomed to in their respective

9. Wright, supra note 4, at 1; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 305
(“Occasionally, though, the clash of cultures will lead to ethical conundrums. Although all
ethical problems are challenging . . . cross-cultural ethical dilemmas are particularly agonizing
because they seem to require a choice between deeply felt cultural traditions. Amid current
heightened sensitivities attending changes of Western cultural domination, the act of choosing
in this context seems particularly fraught.”).
10. Wright, supra note 4, at 4 (“Individualists tend to prefer professional mediators who
have specialized training in mediation procedures. In individualist context, the mediator
usually is expected to be impartial, with no undisclosed relationship to any disputant. Among
collectivists, there tends to be less of a concern about professional credentials and impartiality,
but more of a concern that the mediator be an insider, someone who knows the parties or at
least the context of their dispute.”); Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311
(“When mediators are working with disputants from different cultures, he (Hal Abramson)
advises they (1) understand their own culture, (2) research the other culture, (3) bridge any
cultural gap, and, when appropriate, (4) consider withdrawal.”).
11. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311
(discussing the ethical preferences of mediator’s and mediating parties depending on their
culture and nationality and how to avoid mediator partiality toward one culture over another
while performing a mediation).
12. See infra notes 178-294 (Mitchell mediated in Ireland and Northern Ireland in 1995
and finished with a resolution called the Good Friday Agreement. He also began mediating in
Israel-Palestine in 2009 and resigned after two years without a resolution. Brahimi began
mediating in Syria in 2012 and resigned from this mediation in 2014 without a resolution).
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cultures.13 They both resigned in frustration and experienced great
difficulty and public ridicule during their terms.14 Part III analyzes
Mitchell and Brahimi’s trials and failures in their mediations, and
provides suggestions for mediators involved in cross-cultural
mediations. Through this analysis this Comment clarifies the role of
neutrality in mediation and how a mediator’s nationality influences
how mediating parties and their communities perceive his neutrality.
I. NEUTRALITY AND ITS ROLE IN ESTABLISHED ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS
This Section explores the standardized role of neutrality in
mediation and examines what is expected of mediators legally and
socially in different cultures. The role of neutrality has proven to be
an important element in international and cross-cultural mediation as
it has been codified in the ethical standards for mediators in several
countries, including the United States and Australia, and in the
standards for mediators drafted by international organizations,
including the United Nations and the International Chamber of
Commerce.15 Part I.A discusses definitions and interpretations of
neutrality and how confidence in a mediator’s neutrality has a
legitimizing function in mediation. Part I.B examines ethical
standards for mediators codified by the United States and
international organizations focusing on their requirements for
neutrality.
A. The Role of Neutrality in International and Cross Cultural
Mediation
One of the most commonly accepted definitions of mediation
describes it is as a process involving “the assistance of a neutral
person or persons.”16 The connection between neutrality and the
fundamental definitional aspects of mediation theory emphasizes
13. See infra notes 178-294 (discussing Mitchell and Brahimi’s challenges in gaining
momentum with the mediating parties and coming to a resolution in Israel-Palestine and
Syria).
14. See infra notes 178-294 (discussing the circumstances that Mitchell and Brahimi
were under when they resigned from their mediations, Mitchell in Israel-Palestine and Brahimi
in Syria).
15. Infra notes 49-119 (pointing out the sections of these codified ethical standards that
address the importance of neutrality in mediation).
16. Field, supra note 6 (pointing out that mediator neutrality is an important part of
mediation); Hung, supra note 5.
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neutrality’s “important legitimizing function for mediation.”17 Many
people are drawn to mediation because it offers the promise of
neutrality, which in turn allows the parties to feel confident in the
fairness and legitimacy of the outcome they may reach through
mediation.18
There are many differing opinions about the role of neutrality in
mediation.19 Some writers consider neutrality to be the most pervasive
and misleading myth about mediation and argue that it is neither
possible nor desirable to attain.20 Some scholars also believe that
mediators have considerable power in mediation and that there is
evidence that they do not always exercise that power in a neutral way
as to the content and outcome.21 This virtue of indifference to the
outcome is not always beneficial to the mediation because there are
times when mediators should intervene and question the parties,
which does not draw away from the legitimacy of the mediation at
hand.22 Therefore it is not sufficient to claim mediator neutrality to
legitimize and praise the mediation process.23
The Oxford Dictionary defines “neutral” as “not helping or
supporting either side in a conflict.”24 The Oxford Dictionary also

17. Field, supra note 6, at 1; Hung, supra note 5 (discussing how neutrality instills
confidence and validity in the practice of mediation).
18. Field, supra note 6, at 1; Hung, supra note 5 (illuminating that parties are attracted
to the mediation process because a neutral mediator has the capacity to yield a lasting and
valid resolution).
19. See Field, supra note 6; see also Hung, supra note 5 (explaining how scholars and
writers have differing opinions of whether a mediator can be neutral).
20. Field, supra note 6, at 1; Hung, supra note 5, at 1 (“A neutral mediator has been
described by Roger Fisher as ‘an eunuch from mars, totally powerless (and totally neutral).’
The description may imply that a neutral and impartial mediator should be asexual and without
any kind of worldly connection.”).
21. Field, supra note 6, at 1 (citing HILLARY ASTOR AND CHRISTINE CHINKIN, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA, 102 (1992)); Hung, supra note 5, at 2 (“Being ‘neutral and
impartial’ does not mean that a mediator is totally indifferent to the outcome or the process of
mediation . . . There will be situations where the mediator will intervene and the question is
when should the intervention take place and to what degree.”).
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (acknowledging that when a mediator
interjects during a mediation it does not mean that he is not being neutral toward the parties to
the mediation).
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining that having a “neutral”
mediator does not guarantee a seamless, fair and valid outcome in the mediation process).
24. Neutral, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014) (“Not helping or supporting either
side in a conflict, disagreement, etc.”); Neutral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2014)
(“Neutral: not supporting either side of an argument, fight, war, etc.”).
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defines “impartial” as “treating all disputants equally.”25 In many
mediator codes of ethics, including the United States Model Standard
of Conduct and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Rules of
Conduct, these terms are not well defined or are defined in various
and contradictory ways that result in confusion.26 For example, in the
WTO Rules of Conduct, the term “impartial” is never properly
defined in the text even though it is used several times in the text of
the rules.27 The US Model Standards describe that “a mediator shall
conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that
gives the appearance of partiality.”28 In contrast, the International
Mediation Institute Code of Professional Conduct explains that
mediators “shall act in an unbiased manner, treating all parties with
fairness, quality and respect.”29 These different standards make it
confusing for mediators trying to abide by both codes of conduct.30
Because mediation differs from litigation, which develops over
many years with precise checks and balances, such as case law and
enforceable statutes, there has been confusion in the standards and
laws governing mediation.31 Mediation does not have such well-

25. Impartial, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2014) (“Treating all rivals or disputants
equally; fair and just.”); Impartial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2014) (“Impartial:
treating all people and groups equally: not partial or biased.”).
26. Hung, supra note 5, at 1; Field, supra note 6 (“Theoretically, neutrality is a concept
with many different elements of meaning and understanding. The broadest sense of the term
includes issues such as a lack of interest in the outcome of the dispute, a lack of bias towards
one of the parties, a lack of prior knowledge of the dispute and/or the parties, the absence of
the mediator making a judgment about the parties and their dispute, and the idea that the
mediator will be fair and evenhanded . . . neutrality is used more to describe a mediator’s sense
of disinterest in the outcome of the dispute, impartiality is said to refer to ‘an even-handedness,
objectivity and fairness towards the parties during the mediation process.’”); see infra notes
32-41, 56-68 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (acknowledging the shortcomings of
the WTO Rules of Conduct).
28. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the way the impartiality is
defined in the US Model Standards).
29. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining how the International
Mediation Institute Code of Professional Conduct’s definition of impartiality differs from the
US Model Standards by putting an emphasis on “fairness, quality and respect” to achieve
impartiality in mediation).
30. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that different standards cause
confusion).
31. Hung, supra note 5, at 2 (citing ALEXANDER BEVAN, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 34 (1992)); Stulberg, supra note 5, at 837 (“We could relax the demanding
standard of perfect procedural justice and posit mediation as an instance of ‘imperfect
procedural justice.’ In this . . . situation, the desired outcome is still defined and embraced
independently of the process—e.g., outcomes mandated by or consistent with the law—but we
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developed checks and balances, and aside from several unenforceable
codes of conduct, a skilled, reasonable, and trusted mediator is an
agent of fairness and legitimacy for the mediation process.32
Therefore, the principle of non-partisan fairness is the foundation and
standard for the ethics of mediation.33 This makes the legal standards
for mediators fairly ambiguous because cultures view fairness and
neutrality in different ways.34
Mediators may experience ethical difficulties with regard to
neutrality when the disputants have dramatically differing cultural
conceptualizations of identity, language, infrastructure, and
government.35 Where parties’ cultural norms and conceptualizations
conflict, and where they differ drastically from those of the mediator,
facilitating an agreement may become ethically problematic for the
mediator.36 Hal Abramson, an experienced cross-cultural mediator,
suggests a four-step approach for mediators in cross-cultural
negotiations.37 He suggests that when mediators are working with
disputants from different cultures they should (1) understand their
acknowledge that the mediation process might have other institutional values, such as party
autonomy, that permit parties in some instances to reach outcomes that fail that standard.”).
32. Hung, supra note 5, at 2; Field, supra note 6, at 1 (“This firm connection between
neutrality and fundamental definitional aspects of mediation theory is also related to
neutrality’s ‘important legitimizing function for mediation.’”); see also infra notes 49-120 and
accompanying text.
33. Hung, supra note 5, at 2; Ronit Zamir, The Disempowering Relationship Between
Mediator Neutrality and Judicial Impartiality: Toward a New Mediation Ethic, 11 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L. J. 467 (2011) (“([Neutrality] is considered a necessary condition not only for
conducting proper mediation but also for the very existence of the process called mediation.
The absence of neutrality undercuts the foundations of mediation, so that it is no longer
mediation but some other process altogether.”).
34. Hung, supra note 5, at 2; Zamir, supra note 33; see also infra notes 156-75 and
accompanying text.
35. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“Experts in intercultural
negotiation have identified a series of cultural features that influence disputing style. These
features reflect different cultural conceptualizations of identity, language, and structure. If
disputants bring to the mediation table dramatically differing expectations of how individuals
fit into group hierarchies and communicated within and between them, mediation becomes
more of a challenge.”); Wright, supra note 4, at 1 (“Every mediation has a unique character
influenced by the cultural perspectives of its participants. Differences in perspectives may
impede an agreement if the participants’ views diverge on such fundamental issues as
individual autonomy and group interdependence.”).
36. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“Often stylistic differences
require the mediator to constantly explain, reinterpret and reframe. In some situations, the
parties’ norms will be so different from both the mediator’s and each other’s that helping forge
agreement will prove ethically problematic.”); Wright supra note 4.
37. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311; see Michael W. Morris & HoYing Fu, How Does Culture Influence Conflict Resolution? A Dynamic Constructivist
Analysis, 19 SOCIAL COGNITION 324 (2001) (introducing Abramson’s four step approach).
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own culture; (2) research the other culture; (3) bridge any cultural
gap, and, when appropriate; (4) consider withdrawal.38
Abramson first suggests that a mediator understand his own
culture to evaluate his own cultural expectations and biases when
entering a mediation.39 By doing this he will come to understand his
negotiating style, which his culture significantly influences, and
become aware that it is improper to favor his style over another.40
Next, the mediator should research both parties’ cultures and gain a
better understanding of their cultural views of relationships, language,
negotiating pace, and structure.41 Abramson suggests that this will
allow the mediator to function more effectively when engaging in
dialogue with the parties.42
After considering the cultures of both parties the mediator can
try to bridge cultural divides by educating each party about the other’s
cultural behaviors that may be present in the negotiation.43 This will
help them approach each other with a more open and accepting
mindset.44 Lastly, Abramson suggests that the mediator address
whether the end result of the mediation is congruent with his own
38. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311; Morris & Fu, supra note 37
(discussing Abramson’s four step approach and illuminating the importance of culture in this
approach).
39. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311; Morris & Fu, supra note 37
(emphasizing how a mediator understanding his own inherent cultural biases can lead to a
more neutral and legitimate mediation process).
40. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (“If the mediator scrutinizes her
own background, she will come to understand that her negotiating style is heavily culturally
determined. She will see that predilections for meandering versus strictly cosseted meetings,
for vague versus meticulous drafting, or for formal versus informal manners of speech are
equally valid choices, and that it would be improper for her to favor one cultural style over
another.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.
41. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (for example, because a party is
“from Asia, the mediator should inquire into Asian practices and gather as much information
as possible about prevailing cultural norms of the area.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.
42. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (“One the mediator gains a
better understanding of the buyer’s view of relationships, language, negotiating pace, and
structure, she can function more effectively as interlocutor.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra
note 37.
43. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (“At this point, the mediator can
attempt to bridge the cultural divide by helping educate each party about the other’s culturally
driven behavior and help them approach one another with a more open and accepting mind.”);
see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.
44. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 312 (for example, “the mediator
might explain to the impatient seller (party) that the buyer (party) is working with a different
set of goals for the negotiation. She might help the seller see that the buyer’s elliptical use of
language fits into his larger notion of keeping relations harmonious”); see also Morris & Fu,
supra note 37.
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sense of ethics and professionalism.45 It is possible that the cultural
differences between the parties have already damaged their trust of
one another and misunderstandings have reached such a point where
the mediator is unable to facilitate common ground between the
parties.46 In some cases achieving common ground between disputing
parties is not enough to gain a successful resolution between them if
the person mediating the case is not comfortable or equipped to
navigate the parties to this shared objective.47
B. Established Ethical Standards of Neutrality for Mediators
As explained previously, neutrality and fairness are viewed as
important legitimizing aspects in the practice of mediation and have
been exemplified in many codes of ethics for mediators.48 Several
countries, including the United States and Australia, have codified
ethical requirements for mediations.49 International organizations such
as the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), International
Mediation Institute (“IMI”), and the United Nations also have
codified ethical requirements for mediators.50 These requirements
have neutrality standards for mediators and ethical guidelines for
mediations.51
i. United States
The United States has codified the Model Standards of Conduct
for Mediators (“US Model Standards”).52 The goals of these ethical
45. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313 (“In some multicultural disputes
. . . the culture clash leads to ethical problems.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.
46. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313 (“Working with culturally
diverse parties, a mediator needs to consider whether the end result comports with her own
sense of ethics and professionalism.”); see also Morris & Fu, supra note 37.
47. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313 (“In some cases, the question is
not whether the mediator can locate common ground, but whether the ground that one or both
parties insist on occupying is terrain the mediator feels comfortable sharing.”); see also Morris
& Fu, supra note 37.
48. Infra notes 52-116 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of standards
of neutrality in many different ethical requirements and suggestions for mediators).
49. Infra notes 53 and 77 and accompanying text (noting the US Model Standards and
Australian Standards).
50. Infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text (noting the ICC Mediation Rules, IMI
Code of Professional Conduct and UN Guidance for Effective Mediation).
51. Infra notes 52-116 and accompanying text.
52. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. ARB. ASSOC. 2005); (AM.
BAR ASSOC. 2005); (ASSOC. FOR CONFLICT RES. 2005) [hereinafter US Model Standards]
(“The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators was prepared in 1994 by the American
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guidelines are to guide the conduct of mediations, inform the
mediating parties, and promote the public confidence in mediation.53
Although the US Model Standards do not have the force of law,
unless and until adopted by a court or other regulatory authority, they
should alert mediators that the US Model Standards might be viewed
as a standard of care for mediations.54
Self determination, impartiality, conflicts of interest, and
competence are four standards included in this model code that
implicate the mediator’s neutrality.55 The US Model Standards define
“self determination” as the act of mediation participants coming to a
voluntary uncoerced decision where each party makes free and
informed choices.56 This standard requires that a mediator not
undermine a party’s self determination for numerous reasons.57 In
order to do this, the mediator’s country of origin and the people and
views of that country must not affect his judgment when mediating.58
According to the US Model Standards, impartiality is “freedom
from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”59 The standard of impartiality
requires that a mediator not be prejudiced in reaction to a participant’s
personal characteristics, background, values and beliefs, performance
at a mediation, or any other reason.60 This standard also requires a
mediator to withdraw if he cannot conduct mediations in an impartial
manner.61
Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution, and
the Association for Conflict Resolution.”).
53. Id. at 2 (“These ethical guidelines serve three primary goals: (1) to guide the conduct
of mediations; (2) to inform the mediating parties; and (3) to promote the public confidence in
mediation as a process for resolving disputes.”).
54. Id. at 3 (“These Standards, unless and until adopted by a court or other regulatory
authority do not have the force of law. Nonetheless, the fact that these Standards have been
adopted by the respective sponsoring entities, should alert mediators to the fact that the
Standards might be viewed as establishing a standard of care for mediators.”).
55. Id. at 2-4 (outlining the standards in the US Model Standards that acknowledge the
importance of neutrality and impartiality in mediation).
56. Id. at 3 (“Self Determination is an act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision
in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome.”).
57. Id. at 4 (“A mediator shall not undermine party self-determination by any party for
reasons such as higher settlement rates and egos, increased fees, or outside pressures from
court personnel, program administrators, provider organizations, the media or others.”).
58. Id. (emphasizing the role of the mediator’s country of origin).
59. Id. (“A mediator shall decline a mediation if the mediator cannot conduct it in an
impartial manner. Impartiality means freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”).
60. Id. (listing qualities of mediating parties that a mediator shall not have prejudice
against).
61. Id. (“If at any time a mediator is unable to conduct a mediation in an impartial
manner, the mediator shall withdraw.”).
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Under the US Model Standards, mediators are required to avoid
conflicts of interest.62 The Model Standards indicate that a conflict of
interest can arise from a mediator’s relationship with the dispute or
with a mediation participant.63 The mediator’s nationality and his
country of origin’s relationship with a mediation participant and the
dispute can create a conflict of interest that could affect the outcome
of the mediation.64 An example of this was George Mitchell’s
mediation in Israel-Palestine from 2009-2011 where the political
relationship between the United States, Mitchell’s home country, and
Israel created a conflict of interest and Palestinian distrust of Mitchell,
which stymied progress in this mediation.65
The standard of competence, which requires that a person
selected as a mediator should possess cultural understanding and
impartiality among other qualities, includes concern for cultural
biases.66 This concern is reflected in the list of necessary qualities of a
mediator including cultural understanding, which shows a concern for
neutrality in multi-cultural mediations.67 These requirements in the
US Model Standards exemplify that the United States is making
efforts to create mediator standards of neutrality that indirectly
recognize and account for cultural differences.68

62. Id. (“A mediator shall avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of
interest during and after a mediation.”).
63. Id. (“A conflict of interest can arise from involvement by a mediator with the subject
matter of the dispute or from any relationship between a mediator and any mediation
participant, whether past or present, personal or professional, that reasonably raises a question
of a mediator’s impartiality.”).
64. Id. (explaining how a micro example of a conflict of interest being caused by a
mediator’s relationship with one party in the mediation can be the same on a macro level as
well when a country involved in facilitating a mediation can cause a conflict of interest by
having a relationship with a country that is a party to the mediation).
65. Id.; see infra notes 221-65 and accompanying text (describing Mitchell’s difficulties
mediating in a country where one party, the Palestinians, considered Mitchell impartial
because of the relationship between Mitchell’s home country and the other party in the
mediation, Israel).
66. US Model Standards, supra note 52, at 5-6 (“Any person may be selected as a
mediator, provided that the parties are satisfied with the mediator’s competence and
qualifications. Training, experience in mediation, skills, cultural understandings and other
qualities are often necessary for mediator competence.”).
67. Id. (highlighting the mediator quality of cultural understanding).
68. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM ARB. ASSOC. 2005)
(emphasizing the sections of the US Model Standards that include and illuminate the
importance of neutrality and cultural understanding in the practice of mediation).
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ii. Australia
The work and theories developed by US professional groups,
such as the American Arbitration Association and American Bar
Association, provide the basis for the Australian Ethical Standards for
Mediators (“Australian Standards”).69 The Australian Standards are
offered in an educational capacity to provide an ethical and practical
framework to assist mediators.70 They are merely guidelines for
mediators and are not enforceable.71 The Australian Ethical Standards
set forth the same goals for mediation standards as the US Model
Standards.72 Under the Australian Standards, the mediation process is
facilitated by an impartial person whose job is to promote an
uncoerced agreement and enable the parties to reach their own
agreement.73
The Australian Standards include a requirement that the
mediator must avoid partiality or prejudice and conduct that gives an
appearance of partiality or prejudice.74 If the mediator is unable to act
impartially he must withdraw from the mediation.75 There is also a
69. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS 2 (LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA 2011)
(“These guidelines are based on the work of four professional groups in the United States: The
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, the Society of Professionals
in Dispute Resolution, and the Association for Conflict Resolution. They were reworked for
Australia in 1996 by members of the Law Council of Australia Expert Standing Committee on
Alternative Dispute Resolution. . . . They were further reviewed and updated by the Committee
in February 2000 and in February 2006. . . . In its February 2006 review, the Committee
adopted some aspects of the Draft European Code of Conduct for Mediators, April 2004 on
Independence and Neutrality.”).
70. Id. (“The Law Council of Australia has developed these guidelines to serve as a
general ethical and practical framework for the practice of mediation. The guidelines are
intended to apply to all types of mediation. . . . They are offered in the hope that they will
serve an educational function and provide assistance to individuals, organisations and
institutions involved in mediation in all practice contexts.”).
71. Id. (highlighting that the Australian guidelines are intended for educational and
instructional purposes).
72. Id. (“The guidelines are intended to perform three major functions: To serve as a
guide for the conduct of mediators; To inform the mediating parties of what they should
expect; and To promote public confidence in mediation as a process for resolving disputes.”).
73. Id. at 4 (“Mediation is a process in which an impartial person – a mediator –
facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting uncoerced agreement by the parties to the
dispute. A mediator facilitates communication, promotes understanding, assists the parties to
identify their needs and interests, and uses creative problem solving techniques to enable the
parties to reach their own agreement.”).
74. Id. (“Accordingly a mediator must avoid: (i) partiality or prejudice; and (ii) conduct
that gives any appearance of partiality or prejudice.”).
75. Id. (“A mediator may mediate only those matters in which the mediator can remain
impartial and even handed. If at any time the mediator is unable to conduct the process in an
impartial manner the mediator should withdraw.”).
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criterion that speaks to issues of impartiality associated with a
mediator’s beliefs coming from their national or cultural
backgrounds.76 The inclusion of this criterion in the Australian
Standards is significant because it acknowledges that cultural biases
and conflicts are issues that should be addressed directly in
mediation.77
iii. International Standards
The following requirements for mediators established by
international organizations are guidelines for practice and are not
binding for mediators.78 The United Nations Guidance for Effective
Mediation is used by the Mediation Support Unit (“MSU”), which is a
service provider that assists the mediation and facilitation initiatives
of the United Nations (“UN”), Member States, regional/subregional
organizations, and other relevant partners.79 The IMI Code of
Professional Conduct provides parties mediating through the IMI with
a statement of ethical standards they can expect from mediators from
the IMI who chose to adopt these standards.80 WTO Rules of Conduct
were put in place to strengthen the WTO Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”) and were
designed to maintain the integrity, impartiality, and confidentiality of
proceedings done under the DSU.81 Moreover, the ICC Mediation
76. Id. at 5 (“Whatever their own views and standards mediators should not only not be
partial or prejudiced but should avoid the appearance of partiality or prejudice by reason of
such matters as the parties’ personal characteristics, background, values and beliefs or conduct
at the mediation.”).
77. Id. (highlighting the acknowledgement of cultural biases as an issue in mediation).
78. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing how the later discussed
international organization’s standards for the conduct of mediators are not codified or binding
for mediators).
79. UNITED NATIONS GUIDANCE FOR EFFECTIVE MEDIATION (UNITED NATIONS 2012),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA
2012%28english%29_0.pdf (“The Guidance is disseminated by the Mediation Support Unit
(MSU), based in the Policy and Mediation Division of the Department of Political Affairs.”).
80. IMI CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,(INT'L MEDIATION INST. 2015) (“The IMI
Code of Professional Conduct (“the Code”) provides users of mediation services with a
concise statement of the ethical standards they can expect from Mediators who choose to adopt
its terms and sets standards that they can be expected to meet.”).
81. World Trade Organization, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/RC/1 (1996)
(“Affirming that the operation of the DSU would be strengthened by rules of conduct designed
to maintain the integrity, impartiality and confidentiality of proceedings conducted under the
DSU thereby enhancing confidence in the new dispute settlement mechanism; Hereby
establish the following Rules of Conduct.”); World Trade Organization, Understanding on
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Rules provide guidelines for mediation and are only used in mediation
proceedings administered by the ICC International Centre for ADR
under their procedures.82 The following Sections will discuss how
these international organizations’ guidelines explain and emphasize
impartiality and neutrality.
a. United Nations
The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (“UN
Guidance”) is designed to support professional mediation efforts
around the world and provide a reference to mediators.83 It
encompasses experiences of mediators working on international,
national, and local levels and draws from the participants who have
benefited and suffered from successful and failed mediation
processes.84 The UN Guidance aims to help strengthen mediating
parties’ understanding of effective mediation.85 It is intended to be a
resource for mediators, States, and other actors supporting mediation
efforts as well as conflict parties, civil society, and other stakeholders
in the conflict at hand.86
The UN Guidance identifies key fundamentals that should be
considered in a mediation effort, including consent, impartiality,
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (2015), https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/dsu_01_e.htm (The rules and procedures of the DSU
apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the
agreements listed in its Appendix 1, disputes between Members concerning their rights and
obligations under provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and dispute settlements
contained in the covered agreements as identified in its Appendix 2).
82. International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Mediation Rules (Jan. 1, 2014), http://
www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/mediation/rules/ (“Mediation shall
be used under the Rules unless, prior to the confirmation or appointment of the Mediator or
with the agreement of the Mediator, the parties agree upon a different settlement procedure or
a combination of settlement procedures.”).
83. See United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, 1 (Sept. 2012), http://www.un.
org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Me
diation.pdf [hereinafter UN Guidance] (“The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation
is designed to support professional and credible mediation efforts around the world.”).
84. Id. (“This concise reference document encompasses the wealth of experience of
mediators working at the international, national and local levels. It also draws on the views of
beneficiaries of successful mediation processes as well as those who have suffered from failed
mediation attempts.”).
85. Id. (“While all disputes and conflicts are unique and require specific approaches,
there are good practices that should inform the approaches of all mediators.”).
86. Id. at 2 (“the Guidance aims to inform the design and management of mediation
processes . . . It emphasizes the need for a good understanding of mediation and an
appreciation of both its potential and limits as a means for conflict prevention, management
and resolution”).
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inclusivity, and national ownership.87 It also provides indicators that
suggest the potential for effective mediation, which include that a
mediator be accepted, credible, and well supported.88 In the section
about consent, the UN Guidance points out that the integrity of the
mediation process, security, confidentiality, and the acceptability of
the mediator and the mediating entity are important in achieving the
consent of the parties.89 This section encourages the mediator to use
confidence-building measures to build trust between the mediator and
the parties and between the parties themselves.90 It also stresses that
the mediator be consistent, transparent, and even-handed when
managing the mediation process.91
The UN Guidance describes impartiality as a “cornerstone of
mediation” and explains that a mediator being perceived as biased can
undermine the progress of a mediation.92 It also suggests that
mediators address the issue of impartiality by: ensuring and
demonstrating that the process and treatment of the parties is fair and
balanced; being transparent with the parties about the laws and norms
that guide their involvement; not accepting support from external
actors who would affect the impartiality of the mediation; avoiding
association with punitive measures against the parties and minimizing
public criticism of the parties as much as possible; and handing over
the conflict to another mediator or mediating entity if they feel unable
87. Id. at 3 (“To address these issues, the Guidance identifies a number of key
fundamentals that should be considered in a mediation effort: preparedness; consent;
impartiality; inclusivity; national ownership; international law and normative frameworks;
coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; and quality peace
agreements.”).
88. Id. at 5 (“There are some indicators that suggest the potential for effective mediation.
First and most importantly, the main conflict parties must be open to trying to negotiate a
settlement; second, a mediator must be accepted, credible and well supported; and third, there
must be general consensus at the regional and international levels to support the process.”).
89. Id. at 8 (“The integrity of the mediation process, security and confidentiality are
important elements in cultivating the consent of the parties, along with the acceptability of the
mediator and the mediating entity.”).
90. Id. at 9 (“Use confidence-building measures at different stages to build trust between
the conflict parties and between the mediator and the parties, as well as confidence in the
mediation process.”).
91. Id. (“Be consistent, transparent and even-handed in managing the mediation process,
and respect confidentiality.”).
92. Id. at 10 (“Impartiality is a cornerstone of mediation – if a mediation process is
perceived to be biased, this can undermine meaningful progress to resolve the conflict. A
mediator should be able to run a balanced process that treats all actors fairly and should not
have a material interest in the outcome. This also requires that the mediator is able to talk with
all actors relevant to resolving the conflict.”).
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to sustain a balanced and impartial approach.93 Furthermore, the
inclusivity and national ownership sections of the UN Guidance,
which follow, explain who should be involved in the mediation
process.94 Inclusivity increases the legitimacy and national ownership
of peace agreements and their implementation, and connects to
impartiality by ensuring that the process is not undermined by the
exclusion of necessary parties from a mediation or peace process and
that different perspectives are included in the process.95
The UN Guidance provides guidelines for mediators and
fundamental concepts that mediators should address while
mediating.96 These guidelines also show that the United Nations
acknowledges that mediators should be educated and guided in a
positive and productive direction when conducting mediations.97 The
UN Guidance stresses the importance of impartiality for mediators,
mirroring the national concerns exhibited in the US Model Standards
and Australian Standards.98
b. International Mediation Institute
The IMI created the IMI Code of Professional Conduct, which
provides ethical guidelines for mediators.99 Its introduction
emphasizes that without trust in the mediator’s integrity—which
93. Id. (listing the suggestions for how mediators should address the issue of
impartiality).
94. Id. at 11-14 (“Inclusivity refers to the extent and manner in which the views and
needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process
and outcome of a mediation effort . . . National ownership implies that conflict parties and the
broader society commit to the mediation process, agreements and their implementation.”).
95. Id. at 11 (“An inclusive process is more likely to identify and address the root causes
of conflict and ensure that the needs of the affected sectors of the population are addressed.
Inclusivity also increases the legitimacy and national ownership of the peace agreement and its
implementation. In addition, it reduces the likelihood of excluded actors undermining the
process. An inclusive process does not imply that all stakeholders participate directly in the
formal negotiations, but facilitates interaction between the conflict parties and other
stakeholders and creates mechanisms to include all perspectives in the process.”).
96. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (summarizing the UN Guidance).
97. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (highlighting the UN’s concern for
the education of international mediators).
98. See supra notes 52-96 and accompanying text; infra notes 103-21 and
accompanying text (comparing the UN Guidance to the US Model Standards and the
Australian Standards).
99. See IMI Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 80, at 1 (“IMI Certified Mediators
are required to make known to users which code of conduct governs their professional
mediation practice. They are not required to select this Code provided they have subscribed to
a code, and that they indicate this to users.”).
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includes neutrality, independence, impartiality, and fairness—
mediation is unlikely to succeed.100 Section 2.2 focuses specifically
on the independence, neutrality, and impartiality of a mediator.101
Section 2.2.1 emphasizes the mediator’s duty to disclose,
providing that a mediator may not accept an appointment without
disclosing anything that would affect her independence, neutrality, or
impartiality.102 Section 2.2.2 explains that the existence of any
circumstances affecting the mediator’s independence, neutrality, or
impartiality, if not disclosed, will imply unfitness to act as a
mediator.103 Section 2.3.3 requires that the mediator act in an
unbiased manner and describes circumstances in which the mediator
would be considered biased, and, consequently, would need to
withdraw from mediation.104 Section 2.3.1 also requires that
mediators determine if there are any conflicts of interest or potential
biases and imposes a duty to disclose them.105 The IMI’s emphasis on
trust, neutrality, and disclosure of any biases provides guidance for
international mediators on important factors of cross-cultural
mediation.106

100. Id. at 1 (exemplifying how the IMI Code of Professional Conduct puts great
emphasis on trust in the mediation process).
101. Id. at 2 (outlining this section of the IMI Code of Professional Conduct).
102. Id. (“2.2.1 Mediators will not accept an appointment without first disclosing
anything within their knowledge that may, or may be seen to, materially affect their
independence neutrality or impartiality. This duty to disclose is a continuing obligation
throughout the mediation process.”).
103. Id. (“2.2.2 The existence of circumstances potentially affecting, or appearing to
affect, a Mediator’s independence, neutrality or impartiality will not automatically imply
unfitness to act as a mediator provided these circumstances have been fully disclosed and
address to the satisfaction of the parties and the Mediator.”).
104. Id. (“2.2.3 Mediators will always act in an independent, neutral and impartial way.
They shall act in an unbiased manner, treating all parties with fairness, quality and respect. If
at any time a Mediator feels unable to conduct the process in an independent neutral and
impartial manner, (s)he will express that concern and will offer to withdraw from the
mediation. Such circumstances include: financial or personal interests in the outcome of the
mediation; existing past or future financial, business or professional relationship with any of
the parties or their representatives about with the Mediator is aware; other potential source of
bias or prejudice concerning a person or institution which may affect that Mediator’s
independence, neutrality or impartiality or reasonably create an appearance of partiality or
bias.”).
105. Id. at 3 (“2.3.1 Mediators will conduct reasonable inquiries to determine if any
interests, conflicts of interests or potential biases may exist. They will have a continuing duty
to disclose any interests, conflicts of interests or potential biases that may become apparent
during the mediation process.”).
106. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (connecting the underpinnings of
the IMI Code of Professional Conduct to multi-cultural mediations).
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c. World Trade Organization
The WTO created the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(“WTO Rules of Conduct”) as a standard for dispute resolution.107
These rules, like others previously discussed, require that each person
involved in the dispute resolution be independent and impartial and
maintain confidentiality.108 The people involved in the dispute
resolution are also required to disclose any information that may
affect their independence and impartiality.109 These rules provide an
illustrative list of information to be disclosed.110 The WTO puts great
emphasis on the disclosure of biases and importance of impartiality,
which are important criteria for international mediators and are
similar to the international guidelines of the United Nations and
IMI.111
d. International Chamber of Commerce
The ICC created the ICC Mediation Rules as a flexible
procedure to achieve a negotiated settlement with the assistance of a

107. See World Trade Organization, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/RC/1 (Dec. 11,
1996) (summarizing the intended purpose of the WTO Rules of Conduct).
108. Id. ¶ III.2 (“Pursuant to the Governing Principle, each covered person, shall be
independent and impartial, and shall maintain confidentiality.”).
109. Id. ¶ VI.2 (“[A]ll covered persons described in paragraph VI.1(a) and VI.1(b) shall
disclose any information that could reasonably be expected to be known to them at the time
which, coming within the scope of the Governing Principle of these Rules, is likely to affect or
give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality. These disclosures
include the type of information described in the Illustrative List, if relevant.”).
110. Id. at annex 2 (“Each covered person, as defined in Section IV:1 of these Rules of
Conduct has a continuing duty to disclose the information described in Section VI:2 of these
Rules which may include the following: (a) financial interests (e.g. investments, loans, shares,
interests, other debts); business interests (e.g. directorship or other contractual interests); and
property interests relevant to the dispute in question; (b) professional interests (e.g. a past or
present relationship with private clients, or any interests the person may have in domestic or
international proceedings, and their implications, where these involve issues similar to those
addressed in the dispute in question); (c) other active interests (e.g. active participation in
public interest groups or other organisations which may have a declared agenda relevant to the
dispute in question); d) considered statements of personal opinion on issues relevant to the
dispute in question (e.g. publications, public statements); (e) employment or family interests
(e.g. the possibility of any indirect advantage or any likelihood of pressure which could arise
from their employer, business associates or immediate family members).”).
111. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (comparing the WTO Rules of
Conduct to the mediation standards of other international organizations).
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neutral facilitator.112 The ICC Mediation Rules suggest the
appointment of a neutral third party, the mediator, to assist the parties
in settling their dispute.113 The rules require the mediator to sign a
statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality, and independence,
and to disclose any circumstances where the mediator’s independence
or impartiality would be called into question.114
The ICC must consider certain attributes when appointing a
mediator, including nationality.115 The ICC Mediation Rules provide
standards for the conduct of mediation.116 They require that the
mediator and the parties discuss the manner in which the mediation
will be conducted, and that the mediator provide a written note of this
and guide the mediation by the wishes of the parties with fairness and
impartiality.117
Neutrality and fairness are important legitimizing aspects in the
practice of mediation.118 Several countries have created standards to
provide guidance and encouragement of these factors in
mediations.119 Recognizing the need for clear and unified standards,
international organizations have developed ethical codes to guide

112. See ICC Mediation Rules, supra note 82 (summarizing the purpose of the ICC
Mediation Rules).
113. See id. at 1 (describing an introductory provision of the ICC Mediation Rules).
114. Id. at 2 (“Before appointment or confirmation, a prospective Mediator shall sign a
statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality and independence. The prospective Mediator
shall disclose in writing to the Centre any facts or circumstances which might be of such a
nature as to call into question the Mediator’s independence in the eyes of the parties, as well as
any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to the Mediator’s impartiality.
The Centre shall provide such information to the parties in writing and shall fix a time limit for
any comments from them.”).
115. Id. at 2 (“When confirming or appointing a Mediator, the Centre shall consider the
prospective Mediator’s attributes, including but not limited to nationality, language skills,
training, qualifications and experience, and the prospective Mediator’s availability and ability
to conduct the mediation in accordance with the Rules.”).
116. Id. at 3 (“The Mediator and the parties shall promptly discuss the manner in which
the mediation shall be conducted.”).
117. Id. (“After such discussion, the Mediator shall promptly provide the parties with a
written note informing them of the manner in which the mediation shall be conducted. Each
party, by agreeing to refer a dispute to the Rules, agrees to participate in the Proceedings at
least until receipt of such note from the Mediator or earlier termination of the Proceedings
pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Rules. In establishing and conducting the mediation, the
Mediator shall be guided by the wishes of the parties and shall treat them with fairness and
impartiality. Each party shall act in good faith throughout the mediation.”).
118. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing the standards set by the
US Model Standards and the Australian Standards).
119. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (acknowledging the international
appreciation for neutrality).
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mediations as well.120 These guidelines developed on national and
international levels are examples of an acknowledgement of the
importance of neutrality in mediation and provide important ethical
guidance and criteria for mediators.121
II. CULTURE AND NATIONALITY INFLUENCING ETHICAL
EXPECTATIONS AND THE CASES OF GEORGE MITCHELL AND
LAKHDAR BRAHIMI
Culture influences theories on mediation tactics and ethics. Part
II touches on how a mediator may identify with a party and its ideas
based on her own culture and nationality. Part II.A explores how
mediation tactics are used in individualist and collectivist cultures.
Part II.B analyzes the cultural impact on parties’ ethical expectations
of mediation and the ethical ambiguity that comes from the differing
perspectives of individualists and collectivists when mediating with
one another.
Examples of mediators who were embraced and rejected by the
mediating parties are presented in Part II.C. The experiences of
George Mitchell and Lakhdar Brahimi demonstrate that mediators
may be influenced by confidence or skepticism of their nationalities,
culture and ethical preferences, and their neutrality in the mediation.
Part II.C first describes Mitchell’s successful mediation in Ireland and
Northern Ireland where he drafted the Good Friday Agreement and
dealt with individualistic cultures similar to his own.
Second, Part II.C describes Mitchell’s experience mediating in
Israel–Palestine where his neutrality was called into question, he dealt
with the clash between an individualist Israeli culture and a
collectivist Palestinian culture, and withdrew from the mediation
without facilitating a resolution. Finally, Part II.C explains Brahimi’s
experiences mediating in Syria between the Syrian government and
the opposition in the context of the Syrian Civil War. There, Brahimi
dealt with individualist and collectivist dynamics, especially when the
United States and Russia became involved in the talks between the
parties, and eventually withdrew from this mediation in frustration
and without any settlements or resolutions between the parties.
120. See supra notes 78-116 and accompanying text (discussing the standards set by the
UN, IMI, ICC and WTO).
121. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (emphasizing the commonality of
an emphasis on neutrality in the national and international mediations standards discussed
previously).
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A. The Role of Culture in Mediation: Individualist vs. Collectivist
Cultures
The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization defines culture as “the whole complex of distinctive
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that
characterize a society or social group . . . includ(ing) not only the arts
and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the
human being, value systems, traditions, and beliefs.”122 Culture is a
lens through which we see the world that can influence our choices
and shape how we view the choices of others.123
There are several “poles” along which cultures tend to divide,
and which can explain how culture plays a role in mediation.124 One
pole is a culture’s sense of identity, which divides between
individualistic and collectivistic cultures.125 Typically, negotiators
from individualistic cultures feel less attached to social groups and are
more likely to focus on personal goals and preferences.126
122. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 306; UNESCO, Mexico City
Declaration on Cultural Policies, World Conference on Cultural Policies, 1 (July 26 – Aug. 6,
1982), http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/12762/11295421661mexico_en.pdf/mexico_en
.pdf (“The Conference agrees: that in its widest sense, culture may now be said to be the whole
complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a
society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the
fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”).
123. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“Clearly culture today
encompasses all those habits of action and thought that link us to the larger communities
around us. Thus, culture is not simply what we do; it is the lens through which we see the
world. It not only primes our choices but shapes how we view the choices of others.”); Rivers,
supra note 4, at 4 (“Cultural differences create ethical dilemmas between negotiators because
negotiators from diverse cultures perceive certain behaviors as either acceptable or
unacceptable.”).
124. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307 (“If disputants bring to the
mediation table dramatically differing expectations of how individuals fit into group
hierarchies and communicate within and between them, mediation becomes more of a
challenge. Often stylistic differences require the mediator to constantly explain, reinterpret,
and reframe. In some situations, the parties’ norms will be so different from both the
mediator’s and each other’s that helping forge agreement will prove ethically problematic.”);
see also Rivers, supra note 4, at 3-4.
125. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Rivers, supra note 4, at 3
(“The most common operationalization of culture in negotiation ethics research has been the
‘culture as shared values’ approach, where culture is broken down into one or more cultural
value dimensions, such as individualism vs. collectivism.”).
126. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Rivers, supra note 4, at 12
(“One view is that individualists are interested in themselves, so therefore they are more likely
to act in a way that supports individual achievement and be less concerned for others . . .
members of individualistic cultures would find deceptive behavior that promotes self-interest
as more acceptable than would members of collectivist cultures.”).

2016]

DOES NATIONALITY INFLUENCE NEUTRALITY?

717

Individualists tend to focus on who gets how much and when.127 They
emphasize the rights and needs of the individual, including selfreliance, freedom and individual achievement.128
Collectivist cultures are more interdependent and are bound by a
large web of social relations and obligations, and collectivist
negotiators apply these values to their practices.129 Collectivists place
great emphasis on relationship building in negotiations and are
concerned about how their decisions will affect goodwill, sympathy,
and trust between the parties.130 Collectivists are more concerned with
family, organizations, and community.131
To illustrate the different nature of individualist and collectivist
negotiators, the example of a sale between these two parties offers a
helpful illustration of differences.132 We may assume that the
individualist will begin the encounter by “getting down to
business.”133 She will not be shy about expressing what she needs to
complete the sale and she will aim to complete the deal in a
memorialized document that includes terms and contingencies of the
127. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Wright, supra note 4, at 1
(“Individualism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the interests of the
individual . . . When establishing the level of their commitment to others, individualists
balance the advantages and disadvantages of cultivating and maintaining a relationship; the
level of commitment generally corresponds to the level of perceived benefit. Personal
preferences, needs, rights and goals are individualists’ primary concerns, and they tend to
place a high value on personal freedom and achievement. Self-reliance and competitiveness
are common individualist traits.”).
128. Roger J. Volkema & Maria Fleury, Alternative Negotiating Conditions and the
Choice of Negotiation Tactics: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 36 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 381, 384
(2002); Wright, supra note 4, at 1 (“Individualists view themselves as independent and only
loosely connected to the groups of which they are a part.”).
129. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Wright, supra note 4, at 12 (“Collectivism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the interests of the group.
Collectivists view themselves as interdependent and closely linked to one or more groups.
They often are willing to maintain a commitment to a group even when their obligations to the
group are personally disadvantageous. Norms, obligations and duties to groups are
collectivists’ primary concerns, and they tend to place a high value on group harmony and
solidarity. Respectfulness and cooperation are common collectivist traits. When personal goals
conflict with group norms, collectivists tend to conform to group norms.”).
130. See Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307; Wright, supra note 4, at
1-2 (emphasizing what is important to collectivist cultures).
131. See Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 384; see Wright, supra note 4, at 1-2
(highlighting sociological theory and findings on collectivist cultures).
132. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4,
at 4-10 (summarizing an example of how individualist and collectivists cultures behave while
negotiating with each other).
133. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4,
at 4-10 (explaining the way an individualist typically will approach a transaction).

718

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:695

sale.134 By contrast, the collectivist buyer would most likely begin
with small talk and perhaps do something social with the individualist
party, like have a meal together, before getting to the transaction.135
The collectivist buyer will most likely be uncomfortable with the
individualist’s bluntness and shy away from her direct requests.136
The buyer will also frequently check back with his associates to make
sure his instincts are in sync with theirs.137
Dutch psychologist Geert Hofstede surveyed cultural difference
in over 50 countries and found that individualists are predominately
found in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel,
South Africa, and most of the countries in Northern and Western
Europe, while collectivists are predominant in most of the rest of the
world.138 The Hofstede study also found that the United States was
the most individualist country surveyed.139
As shown in the previous example of a sale between
individualist and collectivist parties, these two groups differ in several
ways that affect their negotiation and mediation styles.140 One
significant difference between these cultures is their contrasting views
of the nature of conflict.141 Individualists usually view conflict as a
134. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4,
at 4-10 (highlighting the typicality of individualists to share their bottom line upfront and
memorialize their negotiations).
135. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4,
at 4-10 (describing the typical behaviors of a collectivist when approaching a negotiation).
136. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4,
at 4-10 (explaining a collectivists rejection of “abrasive” individualist behaviors).
137. Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310; see also Rivers, supra note 4,
at 4-10 (exemplifying the communal tendencies of collectivists).
138. Wright, supra note 4, at 2-3; Malcom Sher, Recognizing and Validating Diversity in
Mediation, MEDIATE (Aug. 2008), http://www.mediate.com/articles/sherM2.cfm (“Hofstede . .
. labels Americans, people from Israel, South Africa and many of the countries of Northern
and Western Europe as ‘individualists,’ whose social pattern Hofstede contends emphasizes
their personal preferences, goals, rights, needs, and interests which tend to be self-reliant and
competitive. Conversely, ‘collectivists’ predominate in much of the rest of Africa and the
Middle East, most of Asia, South America, Mexico and parts of Eastern Europe. Often less
affluent, they may be more focused on achieving group harmony and solidarity based on a
sense of communal duty and responsibility.”).
139. Wright, supra note 4, at 3 (stating Hofstede’s finding about the United States).
140. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text (referencing the previously
discussed example of a transaction between an individualist and a collectivist).
141. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Mohammad N. Elahee, Susan L. Kirby & Ercan Nasif,
National Culture, Trust, and Perceptions About Ethical Behavior in Intra- and Cross-Cultural
Negotiations: An Analysis of NAFTA Countries, 44(6) THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 799,
805 (Nov.-Dec. 2002) (“Individualistic cultures nurture equality, individual freedom, selfexpression, and personal achievement. In an individualistic culture, affiliation with a group is a
matter of choice, not compulsion. Finally, because of the popularity of an adversarial approach
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natural phenomenon of human interaction while collectivists view
conflict as an aberration, thus avoidance is a common, and often
preferred, approach to conflict for collectivists.142
These differing views on conflict affect the parties’ decisions to
participate in mediations.143 Individualists are usually able to
acknowledge conflict and participate in mediation without feeling
shame because they view conflict as natural.144 Contrastingly, for
collectivists an acknowledgement of conflict can be considered a
“loss of face” and participation in a mediation is unwelcomed.145
These differences are also reflected in the type of mediator
individualists and collectivists prefer and what they expect from a
mediator.146 Individualists usually prefer professional mediators with
specialized training and expect them to be impartial with no
undisclosed relationship to a party in the dispute.147 Collectivists
prefer that the mediator be an insider who knows the parties or the
context of their disputes, and are less concerned with professional
credentials and impartiality.148

in education, business, and politics, presentation of arguments in a logical and persuasive
manner is accepted and admired. On the other hand, in a collectivist society, roles are ascribed,
and one’s primary relationships and loyalties are inherited, in-group, and often lifelong.
Conflict is resolved not by challenging the status quo, but by showing concern for continuing
harmony, peace, and continuity, as opposed to any abstract notion of justice or fairness. The
individualism/collectivism construct has been shown to affect work values, cognition,
communication, conflict resolution, and the distributive behavior of people.”).
142. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (acknowledging
individualist comfort and collectivist discomfort with conflict).
143. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (introducing
individualist and collectivist attitudes toward entering mediations).
144. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (acknowledging why
individualists are willing to come to the table and participate in mediations).
145. Wright, supra note 4, at 3-4; Elahee, supra note 141, at 805 (explaining why
collectivists are less willing to participate in mediations).
146. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; see also Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at
307-13 (introducing the mediator preferences of individualist and collectivist cultures).
147. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 310
(“The seller from the individualist culture . . . will be inclined to want to begin the encounter
by getting down to business. She will not be shy in saying what she needs to complete this
sale, and she will be aiming to memorialize the deal in a detailed document that considers all
contingencies and explicitly provide for remedies if the buyer fails to perform.”).
148. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 307
(“Negotiators in collectivist cultures view themselves as more interdependent and bound by a
larger web of social relations and obligations. They place greater emphasis on the relationship
building aspect of negotiations. Decisions to compromise, hold fast, agree, object, or explain
are all made with an eye to how decisions will affect goodwill, sympathy, and trust between
the parties.”).
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Differing perspectives can lead to confusion between
collectivists and individualists with regard to ethics in mediation.149
When a party foreign to the other party in the mediation, either
individualist or collectivist, breaches ethical expectations, they often
elicit negative emotions from the other party who leaves the
mediation appalled, unhappy, angered, and frustrated.150 These
emotions inhibit the cultivation of trust that helps achieve settlements
in negotiations and mediations.151
Walter Wright cultivated suggestions for individualist and
collectivist mediators when dealing with cultural differences between
each other.152 He explains that if US mediators detect resistance to
participate in mediation from people exhibiting collectivist behavior,
the mediator should offer modifications to their mediation formats.153
If specialized knowledge of the disputant’s social context seems to be
useful, the mediator should consider referring the matter to another
mediator with that knowledge and asking him to serve as a comediator.154 To avoid conflicting expectations among the mediators
and negotiating parties, the mediator should voice what he considers
to be proper mediator roles and have the parties understand and agree

149. Wright, supra note 4; Rivers, supra note 4, at 1 (“It is posited that culture directly
influences the legal environment, organizational code of ethics, organizational goals, and the
perception of the other party, and that culture moderates negotiators’ understanding of each of
these situational variables.”).
150. Rivers, supra note 4, at 1; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311
(“Differences in how buyer and seller approach language, relate to status differentials, identify
as embedded in relational networks, and experience time may breed confusion and turmoil.”).
151. Rivers, supra note 4, at 1; see also Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at
307-13; Wright, supra note 9, at 3-4 (explaining how distrust affects the likelihood of
resolution).
152. See Wright, supra note 4, at 4-7 (introducing suggestions for cross cultural
mediations); Rivers, supra note 4, at 15-19; INT’L MEDIATION INST., WALTER WRIGHT’S
CURRENT POSITION AND BACKGROUND, https://imimediation.org/walter-wright (last visited
Jan. 29, 2016) (“Walter (Wright) has a strong record of service to the ADR profession. He is
former president of the Texas Association of Mediators and the Association of AttorneyMediators. For six years, he was Chair of the Newsletter Editorial Board of Alternative
Resolutions, the newsletter of the ADR Section of the State Bar of Texas. He has received
several awards for service, including the Steve Brutsché Award from the Association of
Attorney-Mediators (2005), the Frank G. Evans Award from the ADR Section of the State Bar
of Texas (2008), and the Susanne Adams Award from the Texas Association of Mediators
(2009).”).
153. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; see Rivers, supra note 4, at 17-18 (explaining how a
mediator can try to accommodate his conduct to cultural preferences).
154. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; see Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 30813 (suggesting when a mediator should withdraw or step down in a mediation).
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to those roles.155 If agreement on these roles cannot be met it may be
best to allow the parties to either find another mediator or to choose a
different dispute resolution process.156
B. Ethical Behavior in Mediation
Ethics are the rules, standards, codes, or principles providing
guidelines for morally right behavior and truthfulness in specific
situations.157 The term ‟ambiguous,” meanwhile, is defined as
doubtful, questionable, and open to several possible interpretations.158
When behavior is ethically ambiguous there are multiple
understandings of whether it conforms to standards of what is right or
wrong.159 Policies, procedures, and rules are often considered
mechanisms for controlling ambiguity and uncertainty.160
Ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (“EANTs”) are
maneuvers during a negotiation that at least some participants or
observers may regard as wrong or as unacceptable behavior according
to their cultural and ethical standards and expectations.161 Some
examples of EANTs are the promise to reward the other party at some
future date, even if there is no intent to follow through on the
155. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; see Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 30813 (suggesting that the mediator find commonalities between the parties with regard to
mediator conduct).
156. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; see Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 313
(explaining when a mediator should let go of the mediation allow the mediating parties to
decide where the dispute shall go).
157. Rivers, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Lewis, Defining Business Ethics: Like Nailing
Jello to a Wall, 4(5) J. OF BUS. ETHICS (1985)); Roger J. Volkema, Demographic, Cultural
and Economic Predictors of Perceived Ethicality of Negotiation Behavior: A Nine-Country
Analysis, 57 J. OF BUS. RESEARCH 69, 69 (2004) (“Ethics refers to the moral principles,
values, and rules that govern a group of people.”).
158. Ambiguous, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“doubtful, questionable,
and open to several possible interpretations”); Ambiguous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
(2014) (“capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways”).
159. Rivers, supra note 4, at 4; Volkema, supra note 157, at 69 (“By differentiating the
effects of these constructs on ethical attitudes and behavior, researchers, policymakers, and
practitioners can better understand regional differences in the use of negotiating
tactics/behaviors, how attitudes towards those tactics or behaviors might change over time, and
the relative effectiveness of a universal code of ethics on different populations.”).
160. Volkema, supra note 157, at 70; Rivers, supra note 4, at 1-2 (methods of
controlling ambiguity).
161. Rivers, supra note 4, at 5; Volkema, supra note 157, at 70 (“Culture impacts the
individuals in a negotiation (their stereotypes, intentions, values), the structural components of
a negotiation (e.g., the number of representatives sent to negotiate, the decision-making
approach), the strategy employed (e.g., direct or indirect engagement), and the process
(bluffing, threats, etc.).”).
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promise, and providing statistical misinformation that supports the
party’s case.162 Considering that individuals will vary in their ethical
behaviors based on situational contingencies, perceived ethicality and
the likely use of EANTs have been measured under eight conditions:
1) unspecified context; 2) where the opponent has a reputation as an
unethical negotiator; 3) where the country is known for skilled
negotiators; 4) where it is a very important negotiation; 5) where there
is a time deadline; 6) where the opponent has a reputation as a very
good negotiator; 7) where there will be future business relations with
the opponent; and 8) where colleagues will learn negotiation
details.163
Findings from a comparative study between the United States
(individualist) and Mexico (collectivist) support the theory that
individualists are more approving of EANTs than collectivists.164 For
high-priority negotiations scholars have shown that negotiators from
the United States were more likely to use some EANTs.165 Scholars
have also pointed out that when collectivist negotiators pursue
relationship goals they view EANTs as a threat to their relationship
with the other party.166
There are alternative studies that support the perspective that
collectivists are more approving of EANTs than individualists.167 In
these studies, collectivist Mexican participants scored higher than
individualists from Canada and the United States in their likelihood to
use EANTs.168 Individualist US negotiators were also less likely to
162. Rivers, supra note 4, at 5; Volkema, supra note 157, at 70 (providing examples of
EANTs).
163. Rivers, supra note 4, at 14; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 381-98
(listing conditions for the likely use of EANTs).
164. Rivers, supra note 4, at 12; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 799 (“Based
on survey data collected from businesspeople from Canada, Mexico, and the United States,
this article shows that trust is culturally embedded and has a negative relationship with the
likelihood of using certain questionable negotiation tactics. The study found that Mexican
negotiators are less likely to use questionable negotiation tactics in intracultural negotiations as
compared to cross-cultural negotiations.”).
165. Rivers supra note 4, at 17; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 799
(acknowledging US or individualist comfort with EANTs and conflict).
166. Rivers supra note 4, at 17; see Volkema & Fleury, supra note 128, at 799; MenkelMeadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 148 (acknowledging collectivist discomfort with
EANTs and conflict).
167. Rivers supra note 4, at 13; see Roger J. Volkema, A Comparison of Perceptions of
Ethical Negotiation Behavior in Mexico and the United States, 9(3) INT’L J. OF CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT 218, 218-33 (1998) (introducing different theory about EANTs).
168. Rivers, supra note 4, at 13 (“Supporting the ‘collectivists are more approving of
EANTs than individualists’ perspective are the results of three studies. Collectivists
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agree with misrepresentation and bluffing EANTs than collectivist
Brazilian negotiators.169
US negotiators under time pressure tend to become competitive
and have shown to be influenced by deadlines.170 There is a divide
between long-term cultures, which are usually collectivist cultures
that have long-range goals focused on achieving longstanding results,
and short-term cultures, which are usually individualist cultures like
the United States with temporary goals.171 The organization that
belongs to long-term cultures typically has long-range goals and does
not set strict deadlines.172 But, organization from a short-term culture
will usually have a hard deadline set for their goals in a negotiation or
mediation.173
The tactics that individualists and collectivists use in their
negotiations reflect their expectations of mediators.174 Wright
suggests that in order to avoid conflicting expectations among
mediators and the disputing parties, a mediator should disclose her
(Mexicans) scored higher than individualists (Canada and the U.S.) in their likelihood to use
EANTs.”); see also Volkema, supra note 167.
169. Rivers, supra note 4, at 13 (“U.S. negotiators (individualists) were less likely to
endorse misrepresentation and bluffing EANTs than Brazilian negotiators (collectivists). In a
vast eight country study, Triandis et al. (2001) argued and found that vertical collectivists were
more likely to lie in a negotiation situation than horizontal individualists, because the
collectivists have a greater distance between themselves and the other party.”); see also
Volkema, supra note 167.
170. Rivers, supra note 4, at 18 (“Deadlines were included in Gelfand and Dyer’s (2000)
model, and they argue that there may be cultural differences in how time pressure influences
negotiation schemas. They give the example that a U.S. negotiator under time pressure might
become more competitive, whereas a Scandinavian negotiator under time pressure might
become more cooperative. U.S. negotiators have indeed been measured to be influenced by
deadlines - when told there is a deadline, their ratings of likelihood of use of the EANT
‘promise good things will happen’ is significantly higher than in an unspecified negotiation
situation.”); see also Volkema, supra note 167.
171. Rivers, supra note 4, at 18 (“There are cultural differences in how time pressure
influences the use or perceived appropriateness of EANTs and that this area warrants further
investigation. Whether or not deadlines are imposed is also likely to differ across cultures.
Organizations that belong to long-term cultures (e.g. China or Taiwan) (Chinese Cultural
Connection 1987) often have long-range goals and may not set strict deadlines, while an
organization from a short-term culture like the U.S. will probably have a definite deadline to
achieve its goals.”); see also Volkema, supra note 167.
172. Supra note 171 and accompanying text (summarizing the organization of long-term
cultures).
173. Supra note 171 and accompanying text (summarizing the organization of short-term
cultures).
174. Wright, supra note 4, at 4; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311
(referencing the previously discussed expectations that individualists and collectivists have of
mediators).
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perceptions of proper mediator roles and attempt to ensure that the
disputants’ understand and agree to those roles.175 If an agreement on
these basic matters cannot be secured, it may be best to find another
mediator or choose another dispute resolution process.176 If disputing
parties can understand why there are different ethical expectations
across cultures, they can have fewer feelings of anger and mistrust
elicited by the use of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics, and also
avoid the use of tactics that might hinder resolution between the
parties.177
The following subsection describes Mitchell’s experience
mediating between countries with differing cultural perceptions and
Brahimi’s experience mediating a conflict between parties from the
same country but with vastly different political opinions. The tension
and lack of compromise between the parties of their mediations led
Mitchell to withdraw from mediating the Israel-Palestine conflict and
Brahimi to withdraw from mediating the dispute in Syria. Mitchell
and Brahimi’s experiences reflect on the issues previously discussed
about ethical and cultural expectations of certain countries and
cultures and how these expectations influence the perception of a
mediator based on his nationality and perceived cultural, political, and
ethical perspective and preference.
C. The Mediations of George Mitchell and Lakhdar Brahimi
i. George Mitchell
George Mitchell is a coveted mediator, appointed as Special
Envoy for Northern Ireland by United States President Bill Clinton in
1995 and Special Envoy to the Middle East by United States
President Barack Obama in 2009.178 Mitchell succeeded in Ireland by
175. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311
(suggestions to avoid conflicting expectations of individualists and collectivists with regard to
mediator conduct).
176. Wright, supra note 4, at 5; Menkel-Meadow & Abramson, supra note 4, at 311
(discussing mediator withdrawal).
177. Rivers, supra note 4, at 2; see Morris & Fu, supra note 37 (discussing how cultural
open-mindedness and education can lead to resolutions in mediations).
178. George Mitchell Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 27, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/09/19/us/george-mitchell-fast-facts/; Nicholas Watt, George Mitchell’s patient
diplomacy shepherded Northern Ireland to peace. Now for the Middle East . . . , GUARDIAN
(Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2009/jan/23/george-mitchellinterview (“George Mitchell . . . who has been appointed by Barack Obama as his Middle East
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facilitating a resolution and drafting the Good Friday Agreement, but
failed in Israel-Palestine, withdrawing after two years without a
resolution.179
a. Mitchell’s Role in Resolving “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland
The 30-year conflict in Ireland referred to as “The Troubles”
began in 1968 and ended in 1998 with the drafting of the Good Friday
Agreement.180 The constitutional status of Northern Ireland was at the
heart of the conflict, which the unionist, nationalist, and republican
parties in Ireland quarreled over.181 The unionists, who were mostly
Protestant and formed the majority in this conflict, wanted Northern
Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.182 The nationalists and
republicans, mostly Catholics who were the minority, wanted
Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland.183
The road to resolution for this conflict was paved with many
deaths, violence, and political turmoil that were eventually overcome
through peaceful democratic means.184 Cross-party talks began in
1996, with the help of President Clinton and Mitchell, which
concluded with the Good Friday Agreement.185 This agreement
created a government body comprised of both Catholics and
Protestants, called for disarmament, released jailed combatants,
reorganized the police force, which was ninety-three percent
Protestant at the time, and also stipulated that Northern Ireland remain
part of Britain.186

peace envoy – spent years working painstakingly to shepherd the Northern Ireland peace
process.”).
179. See infra notes 180-212 and 214-64 and accompanying text (summarizing
Mitchell’s outcomes mediating in Northern Ireland and Israel Palestine).
180. See generally Joshua Hammer, In Northern Ireland, Getting Past the Troubles,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 2009), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/in-northernireland-getting-past-the-troubles-52862004/ (introducing the timeline of the start and
resolution of “the Troubles”); The Troubles: Thirty Years of Conflict in Northern Ireland,
1968-1998, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
181. See The Troubles: Thirty Years of Conflict in Northern Ireland, supra note 180
(identifying the parties of the dispute in Northern Ireland).
182. See id. (explaining the goals and expectations of the unionist party).
183. See id. (explaining the goals and expectations of the nationalists and republicans).
184. See id. (summarizing the hardships of the Troubles).
185. See id. (introducing President Clinton’s and Mitchell’s role in the mediation process
in Northern Ireland).
186. See Hammer, supra note 180 (summarizing the Good Friday Agreement).
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When Mitchell was appointed as Special Envoy in Northern
Ireland, it was debatable whether the Irish welcomed him.187 British
newspaper The Independent reported that “when former US Senator
George Mitchell was first mentioned as a possible chairman for the
Northern Ireland peace talks, David Trimble’s party denounced the
idea as ‘the equivalent of an American Serb presiding over talks on
the future of Croatia.’”188 This newspaper also reported that Ian
Paisley’s party categorized Mitchell as “a Catholic Irish-American
from the same stable as the Kennedys.”189
In his book Making Peace, Mitchell recollects walking into a
conference chamber for his first encounter with Reverend Ian Paisley,
who had objected to his chairmanship:
When I entered the room and walked toward my seat my
attention was drawn to the DUP section by a noisy
commotion.190 There, Dr. Paisley was standing and saying, in a
loud voice, “No. No. No. No.”191 He repeated it over and over
again, until I was in my seat.192
I was extremely uncomfortable. . . .193
Although I had read and heard a lot about Paisley and his
tactics, this was my first direct exposure to them, and it was

187. See The Troubles: Thirty Years of Conflict in Northern Ireland, supra note 180
(introducing negative commentary on Mitchell’s presence as a mediator in Ireland during the
Troubles); see also infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
188. David McKittrick, Profile: George Mitchell – The Man to Bring Peace to Ulster?,
INDEPENDENT (July 18, 1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/profile-george-mitchell-the-man-to-bring-peace-to-ulster-1107249.html; see James G. Driscoll, Optimist George
Mitchell Believes Northern Ireland Can Achieve Peace, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 1996),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-02-18/news/9602180123_1_northern-ireland-sen-georgemitchell-ira-cease-fire (“The American, former Sen. George Mitchell, and his two colleagues
made public their recommendations on Jan. 24, urging all-party talks while, simultaneously,
some arms could be given up. The report was received well by some, but churlishly by others,
among them the myopic John Major of Britain. Sixteen days later, the Irish Republican Army
gave its response. A murderous one, it was, ripping apart a London building, killing two news
vendors and making Mitchell feel exceedingly bad. The distrustful mind-set not only persists,
but dismisses the fervent wish for peace among so many in the six northern counties.”).
189. See McKittrick, supra note 188 (acknowledging skepticism of Mitchell and his
background).
190. GEORGE MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE 50 (1999).
191. Id. (Mitchell’s recollection of Ian Paisley’s rejection of his presence).
192. Id. (emphasizing Paisley’s rejection of Mitchell).
193. Id. (Mitchell acknowledging his own discomfort).
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shocking.194 I was accustomed to rough-and-tumble political
debate, but I’d never experienced anything like this.195

These negative views of Mitchell could have compromised the
public’s opinion of his neutrality in the mediations he conducted in
Northern Ireland.196 The Irish and Northern Irish opinions of the
neutrality of the United States in this matter, however, soon improved
and the region began to embrace President Clinton and Mitchell.197
David McKittrick from The Independent expresses Mitchell’s
acceptance in Northern Ireland, saying:
From the minute he first became involved in Northern Ireland in
early 1995, then in the role of Bill Clinton’s economic envoy, his
American “can do” manner generated both optimism and interest.
His style was not that of brash and impatient hubris. Instead, it
was obvious from the word go that this was a mature and
seasoned statesman, a major player with abilities far in excess of
those normally seen in Northern Ireland. In the years that
followed it was often embarrassing to watch the mismatch
between his consummate skills and some of Belfast’s political
pygmies. 198

These positive views of Mitchell helped him gain acceptance in
Northern Ireland and also may have contributed to his success

194. Id. (Mitchell pointing out how he had researched the tactics of a party to his
mediation and what it was like experiencing the party’s behavior in person).
195. Id. (Mitchell acknowledging his unfamiliarity and discomfort with Paisley’s
behavior).
196. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text (concluding the negative
commentary about Mitchell’s attempts to mediate in Northern Ireland).
197. See McKittrick, supra note 188 (“Bill Clinton, once reviled for giving a US visa to
Gerry Adams, is now viewed in Belfast as being much more evenhanded, and has been
cheered by both Catholics and Protestants on his visits to Northern Ireland. . . . George
Mitchell is a sign of this new approach, the hours he has spent listening to Belfast politicians
serving as a symbol of the new recognition of the complexities of the problem.”); Richard L.
Berke, George Mitchell: Gray Eminence in U.S., Bright Star for Irish, N.Y. TIMES (May 6,
1998), http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/050698ireland-mitchell.html (“To the public,
Mitchell comes off as a politician who cannot be bought. . . . ‘With Clinton, it’s all for votes in
the Irish community in America,’ said Paul Browne, 23, who works for a computer company
in Dublin. ‘George Mitchell actually cared. He wasn’t paid for what he did.’”).
198. McKittrick, supra note 188; see Berke, supra note 197 (“Mitchell conceded that the
affection here [in Ireland] was far different from anything he had experienced back home. The
reason, he said, is that people here have yearned for decades for peace. He said his popularity
may also be born of comfort; he has been traveling here regularly now for nearly three years,
so he has become a familiar face, and people trust him.”).
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there.199 This positivity likely contributed to his ability to execute the
Good Friday Agreement because he gained the trust of many Irish and
Northern Irish people and gave the impression that he was neutral and
unbiased in the dispute.200
During Mitchell’s time in Ireland, there were certain aspects of
his mediation strategies that were successful during the talks he
conducted at Stormont, the Northern Ireland Parliament, in brokering
the Good Friday Agreement.201 First, Mitchell made a conflict
assessment by meeting with all of the stakeholders involved from
November 1995 through January 1996 as part of the three-man
International Commission on Decommissioning.202 Mitchell’s effort
to include all relevant parties in his peacemaking process was a
practical method to gain the trust and confidence of the people of
Ireland and Northern Ireland.203 As previously discussed, inclusivity
is acknowledged in the UN Guidance and by using this mediation
method Mitchell legitimized his peacemaking methods in Northern
Ireland and reduced the likelihood of excluded parties undermining

199. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (summarizing the positive
commentary on Mitchell’s role as mediator in Northern Ireland).
200. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the trust Mitchell
gained from the mediating parties likely contributed to a resolution, the Good Friday
Agreement).
201. See Geoffrey Corry, George Mitchell: Role Model for Mediation, MEDIATE.COM,
http://www.mediate.com/articles/corry.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). See generally Daniel
Curran & James K. Sebenius, The Mediator as Coalition Builder: George Mitchell in Northern
Ireland, 8 INT’L NEGOT. 111, 125-43 (2003) (introducing Mitchell’s successful mediation
tactics).
202. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 134 (“Both the U.K. and the Unionist
parties had long insisted on decommissioning weapons as an absolute precondition for any
talks; Margaret Thatcher, in particular, had been unyielding. Yet without active participation
of a broad swath of the Catholic Republicans, a coalition of the center would be impossible.
Thus Mitchell needed to keep the unionists in the talks by giving them enough reassurance on
this core issue. . . . By July 1997, when it became apparent that the issue was still a stumbling
block, Mitchell proposed that the issue of decommissioning be moved from the All-Party talks
to an International Commission on Decommissioning. In August 1997, he created a Liaison
Subcommittee on Decommissioning between the All-Party talks and the new Commission. This
assured the unionists that the issue was still very much alive but not an impediment to further
talks.”); Corry, supra note 201.
203. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 129-30; Corry, supra note 201; UN
Guidance, supra note 83, at 11-13 (emphasizing the trust building gains of inclusivity in a
mediation process).
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his progress.204 Inclusivity also increases the legitimacy and national
ownership of the peace agreement and its implementation.205
Second, Mitchell set out what became known as the “Mitchell
Principles,” a set of six anti-violence statements that provided an
avenue into all-party talks that were pivotal to the negotiation
process.206 Mitchell proposed that a commitment to democratic and
peaceful methods in resolving issues should be the test for
participation in the talks because this would show a willingness to
create progress and common ground between the parties.207 By setting
up the “Mitchell Principles,” he established parameters for these
parties to engage in effective mediations.208 Mitchell was able to get
the parties’ productive cooperation in this mediation without ethical
ambiguity or confusion by having the parties agree upon a standard
for how to conduct the mediation, which led to a positive result.209
Third, he made a deadline of April 9, 1998, the day before Good
Friday, which helped the parties make difficult decisions in a timely
manner and prevented the negotiations from going on forever.210 The
mediation tactic of setting a deadline is frequently used by people
from the United States and individualist cultures.211 Mitchell’s use of
204. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 127; Corry, supra note 201; UN
Guidance, supra note 83, at 11-13 (discussing the part of the UN Guidance that addresses
inclusivity).
205. See UN Guidance, supra note 83, at 11 (discussing the UN Guidance section for
inclusivity).
206. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128 (“The precondition to participate in
talks required that parties adhere to the ‘Mitchell Principles,’ essential commitments to
democracy, dialogue, and non-violence. The violations of these principles were the very means
by which extremist parties would later be excluded from the talks. While banal at one level,
discussion of adherence to these principles consistently provided procedural common ground,
and, more importantly, a set of criteria that would later bind members of a coalition of the
center and distinguish them from their more extreme counterparts.”); Corry, supra note 201.
207. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128 (highlighting Mitchell’s emphasis
on the use of democratic and peaceful methods); Corry, supra note 201.
208. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128; Corry, supra note 201; infra notes
331-32 and accompanying text (commenting on the effectiveness of Mitchell’s standards).
209. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 128 (explaining how this tactic of
establishing standards yielded positive results for Mitchell’s meditation); Corry, supra note
201.
210. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 136 (“Mitchell, in effect, committed
both to a near-infinitely patient approach followed by a powerfully engineered and daring
deadline. The deadline served its traditional action-forcing function. Furthermore, it was
created in a manner that was directly responsive to Mitchell’s lack of formal powers, an
ongoing and significant barrier.”); Corry, supra note 201.
211. See Rivers, supra note 170, at 18; Wright, supra note 4, at 6 (referring back to
individualist behavioral statistics).
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a deadline was met with cooperation in Northern Ireland probably
because Ireland and Northern Ireland are individualist cultures that
were more receptive to these tactics.212
Fourth, Mitchell brought the various parts of the negotiations
together into a document to serve as a draft treaty.213 The
memorializing of the resolution reflected Mitchell’s inherently
individualist logic of trying to get down to business and put it in
writing to reassure its legitimacy.214 Last, Mitchell implemented an
inclusive process involving the Ulster Democratic Party (“UDP”) and
the Progressive Unionist Party (“PUP”) for the loyalists, and Sinn
Fein for the republicans, in which he created an inter-party dialogue
and a joint thinking and problem solving process.215 Ultimately,
Mitchell’s methods of inclusivity, established standards for the
mediation, and deadlines were met with cooperation in Northern
Ireland and led to the resolution, the Good Friday Agreement.216
After the Good Friday Agreement was made, Mitchell was
praised for his efforts in the mediation.217 In 1998 he received an
honorary knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II for his role in this
agreement.218 On March 17, 1999 he was awarded the Presidential

212. See Wright, supra note 4, at 3; supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text
(acknowledging the differing comfort levels of individualists and collectivists with setting
deadlines).
213. See Wright, supra note 4, at 6 (“Individualists tend to be autonomous decision
makers. As such, they are more concerned with how an option affects them than with how it
affects others. In a successful mediation, issues are resolved, usually one at a time, and a
settlement is documented in a written agreement.”); Corry, supra note 201.
214. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (referring back to the example of an
individualist seller creating a deal); Corry, supra note 201.
215. See Curran & Sebenius, supra note 201, at 127 (“Mitchell pursued a process
strategy that stressed and modeled the principles of ‘inclusion,’ ‘legitimacy,’ and ‘consent.’ In
many ways—and yet in line with these principles—he took steps that first expanded and then
reduced the number of parties involved in the talks to those players that were, at least arguably,
capable of functioning in a relatively centrist coalition.”); Corry, supra note 201.
216. See supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text (summarizing the successful
methods of Mitchell’s mediation in Northern Ireland).
217. See infra note 218-20 and accompanying text (summarizing the praise Mitchell
received for his success in Northern Ireland).
218. George Mitchell Fast Facts, supra note 178; Alex Altman, Middle East Envoy
George Mitchell, TIME (Jan. 22, 2009) (“In 1998, Mitchell earned an honorary knighthood for
his role in fostering the peace.”).
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Medal of Freedom.219 In April 1999, he was also awarded the
UNESCO Peace Prize.220
b. Mitchell as the United States’ Middle East Envoy in IsraelPalestine
The dispute between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is over
the ownership of the regions that were divided into Israel, Gaza and
the West Bank after the Arab-Israeli War of 1947-1948.221 Many
Israelis argue their claim to the region is based on a divine promise
from God and a need for a safe haven from European anti-Semitism
during the 1940’s.222 Palestinians claim that they are the rightful
inhabitants of this region because their ancestors had been living there
for centuries.223
The Oslo Peace Accords, signed in 1993, turned Gaza and the
West Bank over to the newly created Palestinian Authority, which
formed one wing of the Palestinian State.224 Hamas, a Palestinian
Islamic political party, controlled Gaza, and Fatah, a major
Palestinian political party, ruled the West Bank.225 However, many
Israeli settlers remained in Gaza.226 In 2005 Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon withdrew all Israeli settlers from Gaza but kept control

219. Altman, supra note 218 (acknowledging an award Mitchell received for his work
in Northern Ireland).
220. George Mitchell Fast Facts, supra note 178; The Honorable George Mitchell, USIRELAND ALLIANCE, http://www.us-irelandalliance.org/content/23/en/The%20Honorable%
20George%20J.%20Mitchell,%20For%20Whom%20The%20Mitchell%20Scholarship%20Is
%20Named.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (“For his service in Northern Ireland Senator
Mitchell received numerous awards and honors, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom,
the highest civilian honor given by the U.S. Government; the Philadelphia Liberty Medal; the
Truman Institute Peace Prize; and the United Nations (UNESCO) Peace Prize.”).
221. See The Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, WASHINGTON REPORT ON
MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, http://www.wrmea.org/the-origins-of-the-israeli-palestinianconflict.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2016); Joel Beinin & Lisa Hajjar, Primer on Palestine, Israel
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, MIDDLE EAST RES. & INFO. PROJECT (Feb. 2014),
http://www.merip.org/sites/default/files/Primer_on_Palestine-Israel%28MERIP_February2014
%29final.pdf (summarizing the Arab-Israeli dispute).
222. Beinin & Hajjar, supra note 221, at 1 (explaining the Israeli objectives in this
conflict).
223. Id. (explaining the Palestinian objectives in this conflict).
224. Id. at 9-10 (summarizing the effect of the Oslo Peace Accord on this this conflict
between Israel and Palestine).
225. See id. at 8 (introducing Hamas and Fatah).
226. Id. at 10-11 (pointing out why there was still an issue after the Oslo Peace Accord).
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over all border crossings and conducted raids, even though this land
was completely in Palestinian hands at that point.227
In January 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary
elections ending the Fatah government’s control.228 In June 2007,
Fatah moved to carry out a coup to oust Hamas, which was
unsuccessful, and led to Hamas’ seizure of the Gaza Strip.229 Israel
later declared that Gaza had become a hostile territory, refused to
recognize the Hamas government, and tightened its blockade on the
flow of goods and people in and out of the territories.230 Although in
2008 Hamas and Israel reached a six-month truce and seemed to be
moving towards negotiation with regard to this dispute and the
violence and rocket attacks taking place in Gaza, the conflict
continued, and Israel continued to occupy Gaza and the West Bank.231
Mitchell was the Special Envoy to the Middle East from January
22, 2009 to May 20, 2011.232 He was appointed by United States
President Obama in January of 2009, and visited Israel and the West
Bank several times.233 Contact between Israel and the Palestinians
resumed in May 2009, after a stalemate of nineteen months, in the
form of indirect “proximity talks” through Mitchell.234 During these
proximity talks, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and
Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas were not in the same room,
and they spoke through Mitchell, making and listening to demands all
brokered through Mitchell as their third set of ears.235 Mitchell and
227. Id. at 14-15 (explaining the removal of Israeli settlers from the Gaza strip).
228. Id. at 15 (introducing the conflict between Hamas and Fatah).
229. Id. (describing the start of the hostilities at the Gaza strip).
230. Id. (explaining Israeli involvement in Gaza and rejection of Hamas).
231. See id. at 16 (explaining the continuance of the conflict between Israel and Hamas).
232. George Mitchell Fast Facts, supra note 178; Altman, supra note 218 (introducing
Mitchell’s presence in Israel-Palestine and his role as mediator there).
233. Steven Lee Myers, Amid Impasse in Peace Negotiations, America’s Chief Middle
East Envoy Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/
world/middleeast/14mitchell.html; Grim Omens as US Envoy Pursues Mideast Relaunch,
INDIAN EXPRESS (Oct. 9, 2009), http://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/print/grimomens-as-us-envoy-pursues-mideast-relaunch/ (“The missions have been stymied by
Netanyahu’s refusal to halt settlement construction and by Arab states’ reluctance to make
peace overtures.”).
234. See History of Mid-East Peace Talks, BBC (July 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-11103745 (“After taking office, US President Barack Obama was
quick to try to restart the peace process. Contact between Israel and the Palestinians resumed
in May 2009, after a hiatus of 19 months, in the form of indirect ‘proximity talks’ through US
Middle East envoy George Mitchell.”).
235. Sarah Wildman, Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Talks, POL. DAILY (May 15, 2011),
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/15/envoy-george-mitchell-lays-groundwork-for-israeli-
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President Obama’s goal in these talks was to have the two States
living side by side in peace and security.236
President Obama and Mitchell’s mission was stymied by Prime
Minister Netanyahu’s refusal to stop construction in Gaza and the
West Bank and Hamas’ hesitance to make peace offers.237 Mitchell
tried, and later failed, to persuade Israel to freeze construction of
settlements in territories claimed by the Palestinians.238 President
Obama’s administration persuaded Chairman Abbas to agree to
demand a complete settlement freeze as a price for restarting talks.239
When the freeze didn’t happen, Chairman Abbas was
embarrassingly stranded and seemed to lack a strategy.240 Doubters in
his own party and his rivals were calling for his replacement.241 “For
months we've done nothing,” says a Fatah stalwart who has
sometimes been touted as a successor.242 “We have no elections, no
reconciliation with Hamas, and no negotiations.243 We're looking
ridiculous.”244

palestiniantal/; An Inevitably Edgy Start, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/world/middle-east/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16117248 (pointing
out that the parties to this mediation were not willing to face each other and the methods
Mitchell employed to accommodate this).
236. See Myers, supra note 233; Andrea Stone, Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns,
‘Hit a Brick Wall’ on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/13/mideast-envoy-george-mitc_n_861838.html (“In
announcing Mitchell’s resignation in a statement, Obama called him ‘a tireless advocate for
peace’ whose ‘deep commitment to resolving conflict and advancing democracy has
contributed immeasurably to the goal of two states living side by side in peace and security.’”).
237. Grim Omens as US Envoy Pursues Mideast Relaunch, supra note 233; Myers,
supra note 233 (explaining how Netanyahu and Hamas hindered Mitchell and President
Obama’s mission in Israel-Palestine and progress in this mediation).
238. Myers, supra note 233 (explaining Mitchell’s efforts to lessen the tension between
Israel and Hamas).
239. The Palestinians and the Peace Process: Will He, Won’t He, Join the Dance?,
(Jan.
28,
2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/
ECONOMIST
15403099?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e; Grim Omens as US Envoy
Pursues Mideast Relaunch, supra note 233 (President Obama’s methods to bring Abbas to the
table to participate in a mediation).
240. See The Palestinians and the Peace Process, supra note 239 (acknowledging
Abbas’ vulnerability when the construction freeze did not go through).
241. Id. (“Doubters in his own party, Fatah, as well as his bitter rivals in Hamas, the
Islamist Palestinian movement that runs Gaza, are sneering at his failure to make progress and
are calling for his replacement; indeed, he has already said he would resign.”).
242. Id. (exemplifying Palestinian frustration with Abbas).
243. Id. (acknowledging a lack of progress for the Palestinians in this mediation).
244. Id. (exemplifying the shame felt by Palestinians after the construction freeze did not
go through).
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After the freeze did not occur, the lack of progress likely flared
Palestinian distrust of the neutrality of the United States and
Mitchell.245 Chairman Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu later
launched talks in Washington in September of 2010 led by Mitchell,
lasting three weeks but resulting in no resolution; they also intensified
mutual acrimony.246 These political constraints caused great difficulty
for Mitchell to create a reconciliation between the parties, which
contributed to his decision to resign.247 Mitchell spent the remainder
of 2010 trying to get the parties back in a room together without
success.248
In December of 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
announced that the administration would conduct proximity
negotiations instead of trying to get the parties in a room together and
between November 2010 and May 2011 Mitchell made only one trip
to the Israel-Palestine region.249 Mitchell said in his letter of
resignation that he initially agreed to do what President Obama called
“the toughest job imaginable” for only two years.250 Mitchell’s
resignation in May 2011 formalized his growing disengagement and
frustration with the conflict throughout that year.251
United States media hypothesized that Mitchell believed that his
patience would help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.252
245. See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text (connecting the negative Palestinian
commentary to their distrust of Mitchell).
246. Robert Danin, George Mitchell Resigns: No Israeli-Palestinian Peace Any Time
Soon, CNN: GLOBAL PUB. SQUARE (May 13, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/
2011/05/13/resignation-of-mideast-envoy-george-mitchell/.
247. See supra notes 234-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 250-51 and
accompanying text (connecting the lack of progress during these talks to Mitchell’s decision to
resign).
248. See Danin, supra note 246 (“Abbas insisted that only a renewed settlement
moratorium would reopen talks, and Netanyahu refused to comply.”).
249. Id. (denoting the use of proximity talks and Mitchell’s growing disinterest in this
conflict and lack of presence in Israel-Palestine).
250. Id.; Ewen MacAskill, George Mitchell Resigns as US Middle East Peace Envoy,
GUARDIAN (May 13, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/13/george-mitchellresigns-us-peace-envoy-middle-east.
251. See Myers, supra note 233; MacAskill, supra note 250 (“Daniel Levy, co-director
of the Middle East task force at the New America Foundation, said of Mitchell’s resignation:
‘Either he has advanced a certain approach that has not been taken up or, basically, that the
chances of negotiation are diminishing by the day and he is not hanging about.”).
252. US Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2011),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43023549/ns/politics/t/us-mideast-envoy-george-mitchellresigns/#.U26hO8cmz8B; see George Mitchell, U.N. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace,
Press Briefing on the President’s Trilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel
and President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority at the White House Office of the Press
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Contrastingly, Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher, the former director of the
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, commented
on Mitchell’s mediation methods saying, “The Northern Ireland
method of listen, listen and listen doesn’t work here.”253 This media
commentary acknowledges that Mitchell’s methods, in which he had
a positive experience in Northern Ireland, were not working in this
radically different dispute between two countries and cultures that are
extremely different from Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the United
States.254
Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, wrote of Mitchell: “He quit because he failed and he failed
because he received a mission impossible from President Obama.”255
Aaron David Miller, a former Middle East peace negotiator, opined
that Mitchell should not be blamed for failing to break the stalemate
between Israel and Palestine.256 He goes on to say that:
80 percent of the blame rests with the “inability and
unwillingness” of Netanyahu [the Prime Minister of Israel] and
Abbas [The President of Palestine] to bridge the gaps on the key
issues of settlements, refugees, borders and Jerusalem.257 The
other 20 percent . . . rests with the Obama administration “that
decided to come out louder, harder and faster than almost any of
its predecessors before understanding what the situation was -what it would take to get negotiations going.”258

These media commentaries also acknowledge that the
Palestinians were not cooperating with Mitchell’s proximity talks and
Secretary (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Briefing-by-USSpecial-Envoy-for-Middle-East-Peace-George-Mitchell (“I want to make a brief personal
comment. I believe deeply, rising out of my past experience, that just as conflicts are created
by human beings, they can be ended by human beings, with patience, determination, and
dedication. Our aim is to achieve a comprehensive peace in the region that will enable Israelis,
Palestinians, and all of the region's people to share a secure, prosperous, and stable future.”).
253. US Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, supra note 252 (academic commentary
on how the mediation methods Mitchell used in Ireland don’t work in Israel-Palestine).
254. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (pointing out that one method does
not work for every mediation).
255. Stone, supra note 236; Peace Deal Impossible Now Says Israel Foreign Minister,
INDIAN EXPRESS (Oct. 8, 2009), http://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/print/peacedeal-impossible-now-says-israel-foreign-minister/ (“Israel’s foreign minister [Avigdor
Lieberman] says there’s no chance of ending the Israeli- Palestinian conflict for many years.”).
256. Stone, supra note 236 (providing an opinion that takes the blame off of Mitchell).
257. Id. (placing part of the blame for lack of progress in the talks between Netanyahu
and Abbas on the parties themselves).
258. Id. (placing some of the blame on the Obama Administration).
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President Obama’s aggressive approach in Israel-Palestine, which
were inherently individualist.259 These commentaries also bring to
light the theory that the Obama Administration may not be making
progress in Israel-Palestine because it lacks an understanding of the
conflict.260
The Jewish Daily Forward reported on Mitchell’s resignation:
Mitchell tried to remain optimistic regarding the prospects
for peace in the Middle East, and frequently repeated the story
about his tenure as peace negotiator for Northern Ireland, where
he experienced “700 days of failure and one day of success.”261
But as his 700th day as Middle East envoy passed, frustration
among Mitchell and his team members was evident and on the
rise.262 According to activists involved in the process, Mitchell
expressed this frustration in private talks, and for the past several
months, observers in Washington speculated that his days as
special envoy were coming to an end.263

Mitchell resigned in May 2011 in frustration that may have
stemmed from the fact that the methods he had used in Northern
Ireland did not yield the same successful result in Israel-Palestine.264
This failure could have also resulted from the Palestinian’s lack of
trust felt towards President Obama and Mitchell and in the neutrality
of the United States and Mitchell in this conflict.265
ii. Lakhdar Brahimi as the United Nations’ Special Envoy in Syria
In August 2012 Lakhdar Brahimi replaced Kofi Annan as the
United Nations Special Envoy to Syria after the former United
Nations Secretary-General resigned from the job.266 Brahimi took
259. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text; see also supra note 133 and
accompanying text (exemplifying individualist behavior).
260. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text (analyzing the previous media
commentaries and concluding that this mediation may have lacked progress because of the
mediator’s lack of understanding of the conflict).
261. Nathan Guttman, Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, Amid Frustration, Turf
Wars, FORWARD (May 13, 2011), http://forward.com/articles/137797/mideast-envoy-georgemitchell-resigns-amid-frustra/.
262. Id. (pointing out Mitchell’s frustration in Israel-Palestine).
263. Id. (describing Mitchell’s frustrations that led to his resignation).
264. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (hypothesizing why Mitchell was so
frustrated with the lack of progress in his mediation in Israel-Palestine).
265. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that the failure
experienced in Israel-Palestine could have resulted from Palestinian distrust of the mediator).
266. Terri Rupar, U.N. Envoy on Syria Lakhdar Brahimi: A Primer, WASH. POST (Jan.
24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/un-envoy-on-syria-lakhdar-
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over where Annan left off for the UN-Arab League peace mission,
also known as the six-point plan for Syria that called for military
pullback, establishment of ceasefires, and political discourse.267 From
2012 to 2014, Brahimi contributed to the launch of and mediated in
the Geneva II Middle East Peace Conference (“Geneva II
Conference”) to help end the Syrian Civil War, which has contributed
to over 100,000 deaths and the displacement of over nine million
people from their homes since the conflict began between the
government of President Bashar al-Assad and various groups seeking
to oust that regime.268 The goal of the Geneva II Conference was to
attain a political solution to the Syrian conflict through an agreement
between the Syrian government and opposition to implement the
Geneva Communiqué, which calls for the establishment of a
transitional government in Syria that would lead to holding
elections.269
Although communication between the parties revealed some
commonalities, the first round of talks ended on January 31, 2014
with no progress.270 Brahimi said that during these talks he observed
some common ground between the parties, which included a
commitment to discuss implementation of the Geneva Communiqué
to achieve a political solution and a recognition that to do so they
brahimi-a-primer/2014/01/24/c245b376-8531-11e3-bbe5-6a2a3141e3a9_story.html
(introducing Brahimi’s role as mediator in Syria); Somini Sengupta, Few Eager to Talk Peace
in Syria, but a Mediator Won’t Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/11/05/world/middleeast/while-few-seem-eager-to-talk-peace-in-syria-un-mediator-wontstop.html?_r=0.
267. Kofi Annan’s Six-Point Plan for Syria, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012327153111767387.html/; Text of Annan’s SixPoint Peace Plan for Syria, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/04/04/us-syria-ceasefire-idUSBRE8330HJ20120404 (summarizing Annan’s sixpoint plan for Syria).
268. See generally ‘No Progress to Speak of’ as First Round of UN-Sponsored Syria
Peace Talks Ends, UN NEWS CTR. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=47052#.VNT3m4dzXG4 (introducing the Geneva II Conference and why it
was important for Syria); Preparations for Upcoming Syria Peace Conference ‘On Track,’
Says UN Chief, UN NEWS CTR. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=46812#.VNTt8IdzXG5; What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?, BBC
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442.
269. See What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?, supra note 268 (summarizing the
goals of the Geneva II Conference and introducing the Geneva Communiqué).
270. ‘No Progress to Speak of’ as First Round of UN-Sponsored Syria Peace Talks
Ends, supra note 268; see Anne Barnard & Rick Gladstone, Syria Denounces U.N. Envoy as
‘Biased’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/world/middleeast/
syria-rebels-raid-air-base-idlib.html (summarizing the result of the first round of talks).
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must agree on an end to the conflict and establishment of a
transitional government.271 A second round of talks was scheduled in
February 2014 and Brahimi explained that this would be a short break
to allow the parties to prepare their more detailed positions on the
issues raised and the Geneva Communiqué.272
The second round of the Geneva II Conference ended without
progress as well.273 Brahimi said that his proposed agenda for another
round of talks, which would focus first on ending the violence and
terrorism and second on creating a transitional government, was
blocked by President Assad’s representatives.274 He expressed that the
Syrian government’s stance in this round made the opposition
suspicious that the government had no intention to discuss a
transitional government at all and he apologized to the Syrian people
for the lack of progress.275
To help facilitate negotiations, Brahimi brought the United
States, a supporter of the Syrian opposition, and Russia, a supporter of
the Syrian government, into the talks between the Syrian parties in
Geneva.276 The United States and Russia taking roles in this
mediation could have increased pressure on the Syrian parties to come
to an agreement.277 Although the United States and Russia were
271. ‘No Progress to Speak of’ as First Round of UN-Sponsored Syria Peace Talks
Ends, supra note 268 (Brahimi’s observation of the mediation).
272. Id. (describing the circumstances of the second round of talks for the Geneva II
Conference).
273. Anne Barnard & Nick Cumming-Bruce, After Second Round of Syria Talks, No
Agreement Even on How to Negotiate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/02/16/world/middleeast/after-second-round-of-syria-talks-no-agreement-even-on-howto-negotiate.html (introducing the failure of the second round of talks); Daniel Boffey, UN
Mediator Blames Bashar al-Assad as Syrian Peace Talks Falter, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/16/syria-talks-assad-brahimi-un.
274. Boffey, supra note 273 (Brahimi blaming Assad for a lack of progress in the second
round of talks).
275. Id. (Brahimi expressed his frustrations with one party, Assad, of the mediation).
276. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“The efforts by the special envoy, Lakhdar
Brahimi, include a planned meeting in Geneva on Friday with top diplomats from the two
powers on opposite sides of the Syria conflict: the United States, which supports the
insurgency, and Russia, which supports the Syrian government but has increasingly displayed
ambiguity about support for President Bashar al-Assad himself.”); see Ghassan Charbel,
Brahimi: Geneva I Communique Was ‘Superficial’, AL-MONITOR (June 26, 2014), http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/syria-brahimi-interview-envoy-reasonsfailure.html.
277. Nick Cumming-Bruce & Hwaida Saad, New Round of Syria Talks Off to a Slow
Start, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/middleeast/
syria.html?ref=lakhdarbrahimi (“Analysts monitoring the talks say the American and Russian
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making strides to keep the talks alive, the issue remains unresolved
and the second round of talks in Geneva did not end with an
agreement between the Syrian parties.278
This dispiriting finish of the two-week-long rounds of talks
called into question their future.279 There were strong hopes and
pressures for a resolution because at the time, this conflict had killed
more than 135,000 people and displaced 9.5 million from their
homes.280 Although the talks were sponsored by Russia and the
United States, which support opposing sides, and were backed by
dozens of other countries, the added presence and pressure of the
foreign countries did not result in a discussion of resolution in
Syria.281 Brahimi said that the talks had broken down because the
Syrian government rejected his suggestion that the parties discuss
each side’s top demands rather than spend days discussing the
government’s priorities.282 This rejection of Brahimi’s suggestion

involvement could increase the pressure on both sides to move from shadowboxing to matters
of substance.”); see Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270.
278. Brahimi: Syria Peace Talks' Failure Looms, AL JAZEERA (February 14, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/brahimi-syria-peace-talks-failure-looms201421318362354985.html (“High-level Russian and US diplomats have promised to help
keep Syria peace talks alive in Geneva as they reached a deadlock, UN mediator Lakhdar
Brahimi said. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov and US Under Secretary of
State Wendy Sherman ‘promised that they will help both here and in their capitals, to unblock
the situation for us,’ Brahimi told reporters on Thursday, according to the AFP news agency,
following a meeting with the two diplomats. ‘Until now, we are not making much progress in
the process,’ Brahimi said, acknowledging that ‘failure is always staring at us in the face…
The Observatory has reported an average of 236 people killed daily since the so-called Geneva
2 peace talks began in late January, bringing regime and opposition representatives to the
negotiating table but producing no concrete results.’”); see Barnard & Gladstone, supra note
270.
279. Barnard & Cumming-Bruce, supra note 273 (“The dispiriting finish called into
question the future of the talks. Two weeklong rounds have produced no actual negotiations on
resolving a conflict that has killed more than 135,000 people and driven 9.5 million from their
homes, even though the talks are sponsored by Russia and the United States, which support
opposing sides, and backed by dozens of other countries. The meetings have instead focused
on what to discuss and how to do so.”); see Laura Rozen, UN Syria Envoy Brahimi Said to
Consider Resigning, AL-MONITOR (Mar. 6, 2014), http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/
index.php/2014/03/7851/un-syria-envoy-brahimi-said-to-consider-resigning/.
280. See Barnard & Cumming-Bruce, supra note 273 (acknowledging the pressure riding
on the talks and a resolution to this conflict).
281. Id. (highlighting how the presence of the United States, Russia, and other countries
failed to initiate progress towards a resolution).
282. Id. (“Mr. Brahimi said the talks had broken down primarily because the Syrian
government balked at his suggestion that the negotiators discuss both sides’ top demands in the
first two days of negotiations, rather than spending days on the government’s priorities.”).
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reflects possible cultural differences and disagreement with mediation
methods between Brahimi and the parties of this conflict.283
While Brahimi was working there, the Syrian government
deemed him “biased” in his efforts to facilitate talks between the
government and the Syrian opposition.284 The New York Times
reported that a statement from the Foreign Ministry in Damascus
denouncing Brahimi appeared to be in response to statements he had
made suggesting that President Assad must relinquish power and
waive membership in any replacement government in Syria.285 There
have been other reports of insults toward Brahimi from a pro-Assad
newspaper, saying he is “one-eyed and many tongued.”286 Similarly,
the Syrian opposition party accused Brahimi of overstepping his role
when he had suggested that Assad’s government should have a role in
the talks, and complicated his efforts by agreeing to talk peace only if
Assad set a deadline to step down from office.287 This media

283. See id. (acknowledging how cultural differences between the mediator and the
parties may have hindered progress in this mediation).
284. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“Syria’s government appeared to distance
itself from further engagement with the special peace envoy of the United Nations and the
Arab League on Thursday, declaring him ‘flagrantly biased’ even as his efforts aimed at a
political transition to end the nearly two-year-old Syrian conflict were accelerating.”); see
Syria Calls Joint Envoy Brahimi ‘Biased’, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2013/01/2013110183349199705.html
(“Syria
has
denounced
international envoy Lakhdar Brahimi as ‘flagrantly biased’ casting doubt on how long the UNArab League mediator can pursue his peace mission”).
285. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“A statement from the Foreign Ministry in
Damascus denouncing Mr. Brahimi appeared to be a response to remarks he made to Western
news agencies the day before in which he suggested that Mr. Assad must relinquish power and
could not be part of any replacement government in Syria.”); see Syria Calls Joint Envoy
Brahimi ‘Biased’, supra note 284 (“ The Syrian foreign ministry was responding to remarks by
Brahimi . . . a day after he ruled out a role for President Bashar al-Asad in a transitional
government . . . (and) said it was surprised at Brahimi’s comments, which showed ‘he was
flagrantly biased for those who are conspiring against Syria and its people.’”)
286. Sengupta, supra note 266; see Charbel, supra note 276 (noting the “hired pens” in
the Arab region treated Brahimi as an enemy).
287. Sengupta, supra note 266 (“The Syrian opposition parties accused him of
overstepping his role when he said last month that Mr. Assad’s government should play a role
in talks, and then on Sunday they further complicated Mr. Brahimi’s work by insisting that
they would talk peace only if Mr. Assad set a deadline to step down, according to Reuters.”);
Charbel, supra note 276 (Quoting Brahimi: “I received [criticism] from both the regime and
the opposition . . . They (the opposition) had heard from major and important states that the
conflict was resolved and the departure of Assad was a sure thing. Therefore the opposition
viewed the call to negotiations as an attempt to help the defeated. In 2013, after making
advances on the ground, the regime (also) felt that the idea of negotiations was an attempt to
help the defeated party.”).
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commentary expresses the Syrian opposition party’s distrust in
Brahimi and his neutrality in this conflict.288
On May 13, 2014 Brahimi announced his resignation.289 Brahimi
explained an incident that signaled that it was time for him to give up:
“I realized that this process was not going to move forward any time
soon . . . [n]either Russia nor the US could convince their friends to
participate in the negotiations with serious intent.”290 UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon expressed regret for Brahimi’s resignation and
explained that Brahimi “faced almost impossible odds.”291
Differing cultural perspectives between mediators and the parties
can lead to confusion about the methods the mediator employs and
how both the parties and public perceive him.292 The divide between
individualist and collectivist cultures can make determining whether
the tactics and methods used by cross-cultural mediators are ethical
very difficult and often results in misunderstandings.293 This
ambiguity and misperception was present in Mitchell’s mediation in
Israel-Palestine and Brahimi’s mediation in Syria.294 Part III further
explores Mitchell and Brahimi’s experiences and explains how
cultural differences and ethical ambiguity affected the outcomes of
their mediations.

288. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (reflecting on negative commentary of
Brahimi).
289. Ian Black, UN Syria Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi Resigns After Failure of Geneva
Talks, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/un-syriaenvoy-lakhdar-brahimi-resigns (“Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy for Syria, finally announced
his resignation on Tuesday, expressing regret for his inability to forge a coherent international
response to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”); Susanne Koelbl, Interview with UN Peace
Envoy Brahimi: ‘Syria Will Become Another Somalia’, SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 7, 2014), http://
www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-former-un-peace-envoy-to-syria-lakhdarbrahimi-a-974036.html.
290. Koelbl, supra note 289 (Brahimi acknowledging the stalemate between the parties).
291. Syria: UN-Arab Envoy Brahimi Resigns, UN NEWS CTR. (May 13, 2014), http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47780#.VCxd4CjEfap (“In his remarks, Mr. Ban
said that for nearly two years, Mr. Brahimi had sought an end to the brutal and still worsening
civil war in Syria. Indeed, the 80-year old Algerian diplomat has faced almost impossible
odds, ‘with a Syrian nation, Middle Easters region and wider international community that
have been hopelessly divided in their approaches to ending the conflict.’”).
292. See supra notes 122-56 and accompanying text (referring back to theory about
mediator preferences based on culture).
293. See supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text (explaining the divide between
individualists and collectivists on mediation methods).
294. See supra notes 259-65, 283 and accompanying text (connecting Mitchell and
Brahimi’s mediations to individualist and collectivist theory).
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III. ANALYSIS OF MITCHELL AND BRAHIMI’S MEDIATIONS
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL AND CROSSCULTURAL MEDIATORS
Mitchell and Brahimi’s experiences, considered in tandem with
existing theories on mediator neutrality and ethics, provide a basis for
generating suggestions for mediators involved in cross-cultural
mediations. Part III.A provides analysis of Mitchell’s experiences and
explores why Mitchell achieved a successful agreement in Ireland and
frustration and ridicule in Israel-Palestine. Part III.B examines
Brahimi’s experience in Syria and explores possible flaws in his
perception of neutrality and possible explanations for why he was
viewed as biased.
Taking the lessons learned from the Mitchell and Brahimi
experiences, Part III.C provides suggestions for mediators on how to
be neutral and gain legitimate trust when mediating cross-culturally.
This Section analyzes Mitchell and Brahimi’s real life trials and
failures to gain trust and a perception of neutrality in their mediations.
Subsequently, this Section suggests that a mediator develop an
understand of his own culture and the mediating parties’ cultures,
enhance mutual understanding between him and the mediating
parties, draw from lessons learned by other mediators in failed
mediations, and proposes that standards for mediators incorporate the
role culture plays in the ethical expectations of a mediator.
A. Why George Mitchell Experienced Success and Praise in Ireland
and Frustration and Failure in Israel-Palestine
This Section examines how the people of Northern Ireland
viewed Mitchell with praise and acceptance when mediating in
Ireland, which resulted in a resolution, and how contrastingly
Mitchell was met with skepticism and distrust in Israel-Palestine
leading to his withdrawal. Mitchell’s American nationality and
culture likely played a role in the international public’s perception of
his neutrality and in the methods by which he conducted these
mediations. The opposite outcomes reached by Mitchell in Northern
Ireland and Israel can be attributed to a variety of factors including
how the local populations viewed his role as mediator and how
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participants viewed his own nationality as influencing his neutrality
and mediation methods.295
In Ireland, some of the negative views of Mitchell explained
previously were brought on because of his US nationality and Irish
and Northern Irish views of whom the United States was supporting
in this mediation.296 Mitchell has addressed this bias saying to the
delegates:
I don’t bring with me an American plan.297 There is no
Clinton plan; there is no Mitchell plan.298 Any agreement
will be yours.299 Two years later when I drafted what
became the Good Friday Agreement I made sure every word
in it had come from them.”300
Mitchell made an effort to make the parties confident that the
agreement was based on their wants and needs and not on a US
agenda, and this attitude may have contributed to the Irish and
Northern Irish cooperation with Mitchell.301 This method is reflected
in the US Model Standards requirement for self determination, which
requires that a mediator not undermine a party’s ability to come to a
voluntary and uncoerced decision where each party makes free and
informed choices.302 This method also exemplifies Mitchell’s efforts
to remain neutral and not let his nationality give the mediating parties
295. See supra Part II.C.i (describing how Mitchell’s nationality may have affected his
success and progress in his mediations in Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine).
296. McKittrick, supra note 188 (“Once American and above all Irish-American
involvement was viewed as pestilential meddling, with the US seen as a source of IRA guns
and money. The State Department and the White House were generally Anglophile, but the
Senate and Congress were seen as pro-Irish nationalist and sometimes republican.”); Corry,
supra note 201.
297. Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Accord, 10 Years On, NPR (Apr. 6, 2008), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89418366.
298. Id. (Mitchell detaching himself and President Clinton from the mediation tactics
used in Northern Ireland).
299. Id. (Mitchell directing his plans toward the people of Northern Ireland).
300. Id. (Mitchell acknowledging his and the US’ lack of influence on the people of
Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement).
301. See supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text (describing how Mitchell’s lack of
ownership and US detachment from the mediation agreement may have led to success in
Northern Ireland).
302. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (connecting Mitchell’s mediation
methods to the US Model Standards); see also supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text
(demonstrating Mitchell’s efforts to make the Northern Ireland process inclusive).
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the impression that he was impartial in this peace process.303
Ultimately, Irish and Northern Irish skepticism of Mitchell and the
United States quickly reversed and he and President Clinton were
increasingly embraced in the region.304 Mitchell’s work in Ireland and
Northern Ireland is an example of a mediator overcoming bias in a
foreign country and gaining their trust and cooperation in coming to a
resolution.305
The acceptance and praise Mitchell received for this mediation
could be attributed, in part, to the fact that the United States, Ireland,
and Northern Ireland all have individualistic cultures and had an
easier time agreeing on negotiation and mediation tactics. When
speaking of the Northern Ireland conflict, Mitchell said, “I formed the
conviction that there is no such thing as a conflict that can’t be ended.
Conflicts are created, conducted and sustained by human beings.
They can be ended by human beings.”306 This quote reflects an
individualist notion that conflict is natural with the assumption that
people welcome resolution, which is not the view of a collectivist
who sees shame in conflict.307
Alternatively, Palestine’s rejection of Mitchell’s method of
mediation reflects collectivist tendencies to avoid acknowledgement
of conflict because of the shame associated with it.308 Chairman
Abbas’ unwillingness to come to the table also reflects a lack of trust
in the United States and of the US mediator, Mitchell.309 Collectivists
303. See supra note 301. See generally supra notes 17-18 (emphasizing the role of
neutrality in mediation).
304. See supra notes 197-200 (explaining how Northern Ireland embraced Mitchell).
305. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (Mitchell exemplifying how a
mediator overcame bias in a foreign country).
306. US Mideast Envoy George Mitchell Resigns, supra note 253.
307. See Wright, supra note 144; Elahee et al., supra note 144, at 805 (describing how
Mitchell’s individualist ideas are not congruent with collectivists).
308. See Wright, supra note 144 (“For collectivists . . . even a tacit acknowledgement of
conflict could cause a loss of face, and participation in a typical mediation in the United States
might be an unwelcome experience. Collectivists might refuse to participate in voluntary
mediation, and if mandatory, might resist orders to mediate. If mediation is unavoidable, they
might exhibit signs of anxiety and confusion during the process. Collectivists’ resistance to
mediation, as it is practiced in the United States, is likely to be most pronounced when the
other disputants are current or former ingroup members or persons with whom the collectivists
wish to maintain or re-establish relationships. Resistance to mediation is likely to be less
intense when the other disputants are outgroup members or former ingroup members with
whom the collectivists no longer wish to maintain relationships.”). See generally MenkelMeadow & Abramson, supra note 4.
309. See The Palestinians and the Peace Process, supra note 239 (“They are airing a
plan promoted by the Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, to get on with building a state
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are less concerned with the credentials of the mediator and more
concerned with his familiarity with and relationship to the parties.310
In this respect, collectivists perceive neutrality differently from
individualists and consider familiarity and their relationship with the
mediator more indicative of his neutrality in a mediation than his
credentials and professional background.311
The Palestinians’ fear of “losing face” and skepticism of the
United States could be reasons why they were unwilling to
negotiate.312 Daniel Levy, a veteran Israeli peace negotiator who is
now at the New America Foundation, comments on the need for
change in American negotiation methods between Israel and
Palestine: “If they ([US] mediators and the Whitehouse) are not
willing to pay the political cost of trying to resolve it – which means
not always being Israel’s lawyer – then maybe they need to let others
in to play a greater role.”313 Levy expresses a perception that the
United States has motives to help and support Israel, which make the
Palestinians distrustful of a US intervention in this conflict.314
Perceptions of US biases in favor of Israel may have stymied
that can then be presented for recognition by the UN Security Council in a couple of years. But
few Palestinians would risk relying on the Security Council, where the Americans have a veto,
to vote for such a state. Should the Americans and Europeans then balk, Mr[.] Fayyad would
look as silly as Mr[.] Abbas.”); Parrish, Christine, Sen. George Mitchell on Mid-East Peace
Process, FREE PRESS ONLINE (Nov. 17, 2011) (“Americans have an economic and ideological
stake in the Israelis and Palestinians achieving a lasting peace, said Mitchell. ‘We have a
strong commitment to be involved in the region, in part out of self-interest,’ he said. ‘The
known reserves of oil and natural gas are there and they are essential to our economy. Conflict
could cause major disruption with devastating effects on our economy and on other economies.
It is in our interest to maintain a degree of stability.’ ‘Second, we believe in democratic ideals,
the right to self-governance and to promote that,’ said Mitchell.”).
310. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (collectivists concerns for comfort and
familiarity in a mediator).
311. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (referring to the different expectations of
individualists and collectivists).
312. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (for collectivists an acknowledgment of
conflict can be seen as a loss of face and result in collectivist parties’ reluctance to participate
in mediation); supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text (after Obama’s administration
persuaded Abbas to agree to demand a complete settlement freeze as a price for restarting talks
and that freeze did not happen Palestinians began to get frustrated and embarrassed); supra
notes 246-48 and accompanying text (These political constraints made the talks between
Abbas and Netanyahu in Washington in September of 2010 very difficult and after these talks
failed Mitchell spent the rest of 2010 trying to get these parties back in the same room).
313. See Stone, supra note 236; Do Get a Move On, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Jan. 28,
2010), http//indianexpress.com/articles/news-archive/web/do-get-a-move-on/ (commenting on
how the US may have a bias toward Israel and that they should possibly resolve that bias by
changing their methods).
314. See id. (acknowledging Palestinian distrust of the United States).
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mediation talks led by Mitchell between Israel and Palestine.315
Mitchell embodied the US characteristic of having a hard deadline set
for an outcome in the Israel-Palestine mediation.316 When his
expectations were not met, and he had reached his two-year deadline,
he resigned from this job.317
B. How Lakhdar Brahimi’s Perceived Bias Against the Syrian
Government and Cultural Complications May Have Compromised a
Resolution for his Mediation in Syria
The Syrian government characterized Brahimi as biased after he
made suggestions that Assad relinquish power and not be a part of a
replacement government in Syria.318 Barnard explained that Brahimi
could be “sidelined into irrelevance” by Syrian criticism like his
predecessor, Annan, by the antagonists in the conflict who show little
interest in engaging in mediations.319 The Syrian government, in
response to his comments about Assad, said that Brahimi “is
flagrantly biased for those who are conspiring against Syria and its
people,” suggesting a loss of faith in him.320
315. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (hypothesizing about causes for
Palestinian distrust).
316. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying notes (referring back to cultural theory).
317. See Myers, supra note 233 (“In the letter, Mr. Mitchell, 77, said he had initially
agreed to do what the president called “the toughest job imaginable” for only two years. He
largely abandoned his diplomatic efforts after a failed push last year to persuade Israel to
freeze the construction of settlements in territories claimed by the Palestinians.”); Barak Ravid,
Palestinians Made Your Peace Efforts Difficult, Netanyahu Tells Mitchell, HAARETZ (May 14,
2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/palestinians-made-your-peace-efforts
-difficult-netanyahu-tells-mitchell-1.361682 (“Mitchell is leaving as peace talks between Israel
and the Palestinians have come to a standstill, though he did not mention the matter in his
resignation. He said that when he took on the role his intention was to serve for two years and
more than that has now passed.”).
318. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (referring to commentary on
Brahimi).
319. Barnard & Gladstone, supra note 270 (“The Syrian criticism of Mr. Brahimi, a
veteran Algerian statesman who spent days talking with Mr. Assad and other Syrian officials
in Damascus last month, raised the possibility that he, like his predecessor, Kofi Annan, could
be sidelined into irrelevance by the antagonists in the conflict, who have shown little or no
interest in dialogue as the violence has worsened. At least 60,000 people have been killed in
Syria since the uprising against Mr. Assad began in March 2011, the United Nations said last
week. Mr. Brahimi told the BBC on Wednesday that Syrians want the Assad family to go after
four decades in power. He told Reuters that he saw no place for Mr. Assad in any political
transition.”).
320. Id. (“Syria’s Foreign Ministry said Thursday in a statement that such remarks were
a surprise and showed that Mr. Brahimi “is flagrantly biased for those who are conspiring
against Syria and its people.” The ministry statement suggested that Syria’s government had
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The Syrian government has a valid point in calling Brahimi
biased, considering that the UN Guidance suggests that mediators
address the issue of impartiality by treating the parties in a fair and
balanced way and minimizing public criticism of the parties as much
as possible.321 A mediator’s role is to help the parties reach their own
agreement.322 Publicly expressing that Assad should not be in office
could call into question Brahimi’s impartiality and neutrality in the
matter.323 Brahimi’s difficulties in forming an agreement between the
Syrian government and opposition could have stemmed from this
Syrian government distrust in his neutrality.324
Brahimi’s mediation could have also been stymied because the
Russian, US, Syrian, Arab, and UN parties taking part in the
negotiation, coming from many different cultures, were having a hard
time reaching an outcome with which they all agreed.325 The United
States, an individualist culture, partnered with the Syrian opposition,
were able to acknowledge conflict and participate in the mediation
without feeling ashamed.326 Contrastingly Russia, a collectivist
culture partnered with the Syrian government, seemed to consider
acknowledgement of conflict as a “loss of face” and this shame
stymied their participation in the Geneva II Conference.327
Mitchell and Brahimi’s experiences and failures in IsraelPalestine and Syria are good examples to draw from when making
suggestions to and creating guidelines for cross-cultural mediators.
The following Section provides suggestions for the inclusion of
lost whatever faith it might have reserved for Mr. Brahimi. Still, it did not specifically declare
unwillingness to work with him.”).
321. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (referring to UN Guidance on
impartiality).
322. See supra note 5 (referencing the role of a mediator).
323. See supra note 285 (illustrating Brahimi’s perceived biases affecting negotiating
progress in Syria).
324. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (acknowledging how lack of trust
has affected mediation efforts in Syria).
325. See Sengupta, supra note 266 (“Those fighting on the battlefield do not seem eager
to talk peace, nor do the powerful countries that support them. Scholars of the region say
neither the United States nor Russia, nor the regional powers with a direct stake in Syria, can
agree on what an acceptable outcome would be — let alone how to get there.”). See generally
notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of culture on negotiations).
326. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing the individualist
participant’s tendencies); supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text (showing complications
arising from negotiating efforts in Syria).
327. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (describing collectivist tendencies);
supra notes 270-83 and accompanying text (showing complications arising from negotiating
efforts in Syria).
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cultural factors and methods in guidelines for mediators, such as the
ones previously discussed in Part I.B. It also acknowledges that
drawing from the experiences of mediators like Mitchell and Brahimi
would be useful to help cross-cultural mediators deal with dilemmas
involving differing ethical expectations of mediators depending on
culture and nationality and how these expectations can affect the way
a cross-cultural mediator is perceived.
C. Recommendations for Mediators Dealing with Cultural
Differences and Issues of Neutrality
When approaching a cross-cultural mediation, a mediator can
make efforts to avoid Mitchell and Brahimi’s shortcomings and gain
trust and mutual understanding among the mediating parties in order
to cause a positive outcome.328 Initially the mediator should develop
an understanding of his own culture and the mediating parties’
cultures.329 Next, the mediator should enhance mutual understanding
between him and the mediating parties by discussing their
expectations of the mediation and the mediator.330 The mediator
should additionally draw from lessons learned by other mediators in
failed mediation experiences.331 Lastly, the mediation guidelines and
institutions should acknowledge the role culture plays in the ethical
expectations of a cross-cultural mediator and incorporate this into
mediation standards.332
In order for a mediator to gain success and resolutions in crosscultural mediations it is pivotal for that mediator to develop an
understanding of the parties’ cultures, understand how his own culture
influences his methods and tendencies, bridge the cultural gap
between himself and the mediating parties, and evaluate whether he is
the right mediator for the conflict at hand.333 Mediators should also
acknowledge not only their own individualist and collectivist cultural
328. See infra notes 333-37 and accompanying text (explaining how a mediator can gain
trust and understanding among the mediating parties).
329. See infra note 333 and accompanying text (commenting on mutual understanding).
330. See infra notes 335-42 and accompanying text (suggestions on how to enhance
mutual understanding).
331. See infra notes 343-50 and accompanying text (drawing examples from Mitchell
and Brahimi’s mediations).
332. See infra notes 351-59 and accompanying text (suggestions for including cultural
standards to mediator guidelines).
333. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (recalling cross-cultural mediation
suggestions).
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behaviors, but also those of the mediating parties, and make an effort
to understand this behavior and come to a common ground with
regards to preferences of mediation methods.334
After the mediator individually develops an understanding of his
own and his mediating parties’ cultures and expectations, he should
make efforts to enhance mutual understanding between himself and
the mediating parties.335 In order to avoid conflicting cultural
expectations, the mediator should discuss his ideas of what are proper
mediation roles and methods, have the mediating parties do the same,
and come to an agreement on what roles and methods would be
proper for the mediation at hand.336 When coming to an agreement on
what would be the proper roles and methods to use in the mediation,
mediators can also refer to the numerous guidelines established for
mediations discussed previously, and choose one of these guidelines
to govern their mediation.337
For example, if a mediator decided to use the UN Guidance to
govern his mediation, he and the mediating parties would benefit
from numerous suggestions and requirements stipulated in these
guidelines.338 The UN Guidance identifies key fundamentals that
should be considered in a mediation effort such as consent,
impartiality, and quality peace agreements, providing the mediator
with a checklist of things to consider when contemplating and
executing a mediation.339 Suggestions for how to address impartiality
are also included in these guidelines, which is a great rubric for
mediators to deal with such an ambiguous but crucial issue in
mediations.340 The UN Guidance also has inclusivity and national
ownership sections that explain who should be involved in the
334. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (suggesting a mediator gain
additional cultural understanding).
335. See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text (introducing the suggestion of
enhancing mutual understanding).
336. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of
communication between the mediator and the mediating parties).
337. See supra Part I.B (recalling the previously discussed standard’s for mediators).
338. See supra Part I.B.iii.a (exemplifying how to use the UN Guidance as a framework
to govern a mediation).
339. See UN Guidance, supra note 83, at 3 (“To address these issues, the Guidance
identifies a number of key fundamentals that should be considered in a mediation effort:
preparedness; consent; impartiality; inclusivity; national ownership; international law and
normative frameworks; coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort;
and quality peace agreements.”).
340. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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mediation, which would be useful for the mediator to ensure that an
excluded party does not compromise the mediation.341 Such a
framework can eliminate some of the guesswork and confusion that
can arise for a mediator in a cross-cultural mediation.342
Additionally, the mediator should draw on the lessons learned
from failed mediation experiences.343 Examining the experiences and
failures of other cross-cultural mediators and identifying their
mistakes is also a useful way for a mediator to determine what
behavior is appropriate for mediating parties from certain cultural and
political backgrounds.344 Mitchell seemed to have misstepped in
Israel-Palestine by setting a deadline, lacking an understanding of the
conflict and culture there, being from a country with an obvious
interest in the conflict, and not realizing that a conflict involving a
collectivist party would most likely not accept individualist methods
that he deemed successful in his past mediation in Northern Ireland.345
Brahimi seemed to have gone wrong in Syria also by setting
deadlines, using individualist mediation methods with which he was
culturally comfortable but that the collectivist Syrian government
rejected, and publicly making suggestions about Assad’s current and
future role that gave the impression of bias.346
A common mistake made by Mitchell and Brahimi was using
methods that they were culturally comfortable with without
considering that the parties were not accustomed to these methods.347
To avoid this mistake it would benefit a mediator to reference Hal
Abramson’s four-step approach to cross-cultural mediation.348
Following this framework, a mediator can bridge the cultural divide
by educating the parties about their own cultures and the mediator’s
culture and discussing what their preferences are.349 The mediator
should also consider the ethical problems that may arise during cross341. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (summarizing the UN Guidance).
343. See infra notes 339-45 and accompanying text (introducing suggestions for
examining failed mediations).
344. See supra Part III.A-B (highlighting the need for mediators to consider culture and
politics in crafting their mediations, in light of past failures in Israel-Palestine and Syria).
345. See supra Parts II.C, III.A (recalling Mitchell’s mistakes when mediating in IsraelPalestine).
346. See supra Parts II.C.ii, III.B (recalling Brahimi’s mistakes when mediating in
Syria).
347. See supra Parts II.C.i.b.-ii.
348. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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cultural mediations and make sure they are on ethical common ground
with their parties to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the
mediation.350
Lastly, mediation guidelines and institutions should
acknowledge the role of culture in the ethical expectations for
mediators.351 Mediation guidelines must acknowledge the role culture
plays in the ethical expectations of cross-cultural mediators and
include standards for this in these guidelines.352 Building upon
existing guidelines with examples and explanations of cultural
dilemmas and stalemates that a mediator may encounter and
providing guidance for how to deal with these problems would greatly
benefit the cross-cultural mediator.353
For example, these guidelines could include some of the
individualist and collectivist studies and statistics previously
discussed, such as Abramson’s four step approach and the previously
discussed Ethically Ambiguous Negotiation Tactics, to help a crosscultural mediator identify the kind of culture and expectations he may
be dealing with in a certain country.354 This would help him execute a
plan to understand that culture and what will be expected of him.355
This would also help him evaluate whether he would be the right
mediator for a certain conflict based on his mediation methods and
background.356 Making this evaluation would also allow the mediator
to determine whether he would be able to overcome the cultural
biases and judgment he may face due to his nationality and culture.357
It would also help him evaluate whether the mediating parties will
question his neutrality, which is an important legitimizing ethical
factor in mediation, and whether this distrust between him and the
350. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 347-350 and accompanying text; see infra notes 352-54 and
accompanying text (introducing cultural suggestions for cross-cultural mediation).
352. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (recalling cultural theory for crosscultural mediation).
353. See supra Part II.A-B (suggesting cross-cultural mediators familiarize themselves
with cultural theory).
354. See supra Parts II.A-B (referencing individualist and collectivist studies and
statistics).
355. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (commenting on cultural
understanding).
356. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (referencing knowing when to
withdraw from a mediation previously discussed).
357. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of
mediator’s acknowledging culture).
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parties would create barriers to resolution that most likely will not be
overcome.358 Increased incorporation of cultural issues into standards
for cross-cultural mediators could be very beneficial for cross-cultural
mediations and possibly lead to more resolutions.359
CONCLUSION
Culture and nationality are important factors in cross-cultural
mediations and should be neither neglected nor ignored.360 If crosscultural mediators had tools to better navigate these cultural
differences between themselves and the mediating parties, this would
open up the possibility of more successful cross-cultural mediations
and the creation of resolutions that would affect many countries and
groups of people in a positive way.361 Acknowledging these factors
and drawing upon the experiences and failures of cross-cultural
mediators would bring great improvements to the practice of crosscultural mediation.362

358. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text (incorporating neutrality into the
discussion of culture).
359. See supra notes 346-53 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 37-177 and accompanying text.
361. See Part III.C (emphasizing the importance of addressing culture).
362. See Part III.C (concluding that better acknowledgement of cultural and ethical
expectations of mediators would benefit the profession).

